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LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III

1968

NUMBER 2

In an attempt to uncover a solution to the problem of the increasing
inadequacies of Eastern water law, Professor Farnham has undertaken
an exhaustive survey of the law of New York. After first examining
the riparian doctrine in connection with previous and proposed statutory
clarifications, a comparison is then made with the doctrine of prior
appropriation. The author then concludes that the riparian doctrine,
if supplemented by suggested modifications, offers more advantages
than would a superimposed appropriation doctrine.

THE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF NEW YORK WATER LAW
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
RIPARIAN SYSTEM t
William H. Farnham*
RIPARIAN WATER DOCTRINE

L

many other eastern states which have throughout their
history adhered to some version of the riparian doctrine
with respect to water rights, New York has superimposed on
this doctrine, and kept up to date by amendment, much
desirable legislation in several subdivisions of the water
field.' Until 1966, however, New York had no legislation
which dealt any further with riparian rights than to recognize
their existence expressly and to disclaim any intention to
IKE

fThe

preparation of this article and the research on which it is based have
been supported under a joint project of the Office of Water Resources
Research of the United States Department of the Interior, of the New York
Temporary State Commission on Water Resources Planning (recently succeeded by the New York Joint Legislative Committee on the Conservation,
Development and Equitable Utilization of the Water Resources of the
State), and of the Cornell University Water Resources Center.
* Legal Consultant, Cornell University Water Resources Center; Professor
of Law Emeritus, Cornell University; A.B., 1920, LL.B., 1922, Cornell
University; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1930.
1. Such as land drainage, pollution control, public water supply, hydroelectric
power, navigation and related matters, stream protection and regulation,
fishing, multi-purpose water resources planning, interstate water compacts,
and cooperation with the federal government.
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impair them.' In other words, until 1966 the owners of New
York riparian rights and governmental bodies, agencies and
officers charged with the formulation and execution of governmental water-connected projects, had no more knowledge
of the extent and duration of such rights than was afforded
by the decisions and opinions of the New York courts. Since
these decisions and opinions appeared to be in conflict on
several important points of riparian law, and were silent
on many others, New York riparian law was as of 1965 uncertain to a considerable degree, and still is, since the legislation
of 1966' merely made a beginning on the elimination of the
uncertainties existing at the time of its passage.
THE UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF UNCERTAINTY

Discouragement of Private Enterprise
One undesirable consequence of these uncertainties is
the discouraging effect which they have on some private
corporations or individuals contemplating investment in
water-based projects. While many riparian owners have gone
ahead despite these uncertainties, others have shrunk from
an affirmative decision lest after having spent their time
and money, they should ultimately be told by a court that
their activities were illegal. Just how many have actually
been deterred by these uncertainties is not now known,
but the number is probably too great to be safely ignored.4
Hindrance of Governmental Water Projects
Another undesirable consequence of these uncertainties
is the difficulty with which they are likely to confront governmental bodies, agencies or officers charged with the
formulation and execution of statewide or regional plans for
2. As does the N.Y. CoNsERv. LAW §§ 438, 441 and 502 (1966), and N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 1167 and 1260 (1966).
3. N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 429-j (1966). As to this statute, see text accompanying notes 17 to 47 infra.

4. While others share the view that uncertainties as to water rights discourage
private investment in them [Trelease, Policies for Water, 5 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 1, 23 (1965)] the validity of this view has been questioned
[Maloney, Eastern Laws Concerning Minimum Stream Flows, papers presented at SOUTHWESTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE, 301 (1961); Michelman,
Just Compensation, 80 HAav. L. REv. 1165, 1241 (1967)], and it has been
said that it has not been substantiated by such statistical evidence [O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute, 47 IowA L. REv. 549, 677 (1962)]. The
writer's opinion is based on conversations with persons familiar with the
attitude of New York farmers, and on accounts of statements made by New
York industrialists to state water officials and at conferences on New
York's water law problems.
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the protection and augmentaion of available water supplies;
the need for which has been demonstrated by the serious
water shortages which have occurred from time to time in
the northeast.
In December, 1967, Governor Rockefeller announced a
plan, reported to him by the New York Water Resources
Commission, which might involve the construction of 58 reservoirs adding 153,000 acres to New York's water surfaces.' If
Part V of article 5 of the New York Conservation Law, which
part is entitled "Water Resources Planning and Development," is applicable to this important plan-as it probably
is, despite its statewide nature and despite the fact that part
V might conceivably be interpreted as applicable only to
planning for regions of the state rather than to statewide
planning-a knowledge of the extent and duration of New
York riparian rights will be essential to the execution of the
plan, since section 438(1)(f) of the Conservation Law provides that no plan shall include any proposal requiring action
which would impair any right protected by section 441, and
since that section expressly gives protection to riparian rights.
Even in the unlikely event that Part V is construed as
inapplicable to a statewide plan as distinguished from a plan
for a local region, the New York decisions that riparian rights
are property rights protected by the due process clauses,6 and
the virtual certainty that a plan calling for 58 reservoirs
could not be executed without affecting the rights of many
riparian owners to a considerable degree, make it clear that
without knowledge as to the extent and duration of New York
riparian rights, any body, agency or officer responsible for
the execution of the statewide plan would find that task
more difficult than it should be. Unless the extent of those
rights is clearly defined, it will be difficult for draftsmen of
legislation implementing the statewide plan to determine what
legal obstacles stand in their way; or to decide whether or
not the removal of a particular obstacle would require compensation to holders of riparian rights; or, in eases requiring
5. In regard to this plan see NEW YORK WATER RESOURCES COMM'N. Developing
and Managing the Water Resources of New York State (1967), especially
at 23.
6. See, e.g., Matter of Van Etten v. City of N.Y., 226 N.Y. 483, 124 N.E. 201

(1919).
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compensation, to estimate its probable amount.' And without
such an estimate they could not calculate the cost of the
project upon which its feasibility to an important extent
depends.
Moreover, uncertainty as to the New York law of riparian
rights might in some instances prove embarrassing to New
Yorkers should they find it advisable to seek financial assistance under certain federal statutes.! Thus the Watershed
Protection and Flood Protection Act makes the acquisition
of such water rights existing under state law as may be
needed to install and operate the work of improvement prerequisite to the granting of federal funds The Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956 contains a similar requirement ;o
and the Water Supply Act of 1958 is by title 43 U.S.C., section
390b(c) made subject to title 43 U.S.C., section 383, which
in substance requires the protection of private water rights
jeopardized by reclamation projects. Lack of knowledge as
to the extent and duration of New York riparian rights might
well impede fulfillment of these requirements.
It should also be borne in mind that the federal water
supply statute which may ultimately be enacted to implement
the plan to augment the water available in the northeastern
region of the United States now being prepared by the Corps
of Engineers11 might follow the precedent established by the
earlier water supply statutes known as the Reclamation Acts,
and expressly provide for the recognition of state water law
and for the protection of private water rights existing under
7. "In the building of a road, taking of land or a building obviously involves
compensation and the question is, 'How much? In the water field we are
going to have two questions: 'Is this man entitled to compensation?' and
'If so, how much?'." PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SYMPOSIUM ON STREAM FLOW
REGULATION FOR WATER QUALITY CONTROL (paper by Stein, Flow Regulation
for Water Quality Control and Water Rights) 52 (1965). That in determining whether a taking of property of a riparian owner in the constitutional
sense has been effected by an interference with his rights in the water or
in the bed of the stream, the first step is to determine what his rights are,
see 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 219 (3d ed. 1963).

8. "Whether the threat of federal nonspending is regarded as a carrot or a
stick, it can act as a powerful inducement for a state to review its water
laws. Aside from such consideration, the states should seriously study the
need for revision of their laws. It is easy to be complacent about water law,
to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, to say that there is no present emergency
crying for action. But if this attitude is taken, the state may never know
what it has lost through the lack of development. Trelease, A Model State
Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301,
321 (1957).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1004(1) (1964).
10. 43 U.S.C. § 422d(b) (1964).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-4 (1964).
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it." This possibility would appear to be strengthened by
the requirement in legislation already in force that the plans
shall provide for appropriate financial participation by the
states, their political subdivisions, and other local interests."
Should this possibility materialize, failure to have resolved
existing uncertainties as to the New York law of riparian
rights prior to the period during which the terms of the
federal implementing legislation are being discussed, could
make it difficult for New York to decide what provisions
it should ask for as most important to its citizens, and for
Congress to decide what requests should be granted. 4
While in view of the foregoing it is apparent that there
are two cogent reasons why the number of existing uncertainties in New York riparian law should be reduced, 5 the
question remains as to whether such reduction can and should
be accomplished within the framework of the riparian system
by clarification and revision of New York riparian law; that
is, without causing any more substantial uncompensated
impairment of property rights than has been caused by other
legislation which has proved to be generally acceptable to
property owners and the public, and without resort to the
principles of the prior appropriation system of water law.
12. As in 43 U.S.C., § 383 (1964).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-4(3) (1964). As it is conceivable that Congress, when
imposing this requirement, realized that a plan complying with it would
probably be more acceptable to the states and other local entities if it called
for implementing federal legislation which followed the Reclamation Acts
pattern rather than that of the federal water project statutes founded on
the commerce power under which disadvantaged riparian owners receive
no compensation for loss of water use (Morreale, Federal Power in Western
Waters: The NavigationPower and the Rule of No Compensation,3 NATURAL
REsOURCES J. 1, 20, 75 (1963)), it is likewise conceivable that Congress will
be thinking in Reclamation Act rather than in commerce power terms when
it enacts the implementing legislation. 43 U.S.C., § 390b (1964) appears to
apply Reclamation Act principles to some projects in which the Corps of
Engineers plays a part. There would seem to be no conclusive reason why
such principles could not be made applicable to projects executed solely
by the Corps.
14. "The legal tangle of water law and water rights also presents a very real
impediment to overall planning. For planning requires and presupposes a
favorable legal structure in the framework of which necessary adjustments
can be made to meet the demands of the community. It is apparent that
those who desire basin-wide development programs give too little recognition
to the enormous problems of adjusting the already established rights in
water under state and federal laws and constitutions." MANN, THE POLITICS
OF WATER IN ARIZONA 16 (1963).

15. The goal should be the reduction rather than the complete elimination of
the uncertainties in New York riparian law, because there are some uncertainties which for cogent reasons it would be advisable to preserve to a
limited extent. See text accompanying notes 113 to 134 infra.
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It is submitted that this question can be answered in the
affirmative."6
UNCERTAINTIES CLARIFIED By HARMLESS USE LAW

Harmless Alterations in Natural Condition of
Streams and Lakes
Appreciable support for this conclusion is afforded by
what has already been accomplished by the harmless use
statute enacted in 1966 as section 429-j of the New York
Conservation Law. Prior to this statute it had been charged
that the New York riparian system was one of "enforced
waste,"' 7 because it had been held in nine cases that an
alteration in the natural condition of a stream or lake could
be enjoined even though the alteration was not causing the
plaintiff any harm."3 In view of these holdings, many riparian
owners were compelled to allow streams to flow down to the
sea unused, and to forego attempts to develop the potential
utility of lakes, even though the alterations of natural conditions which they had in mind could have been made without
harm to others. In other words, it was alleged in substance
that by these decisions New York had committed itself to
the natural flow version of the riparian doctrine, which
requires that streams and lakes be allowed to remain in their
natural condition, 9 and had rejected the reasonable use
version of the riparian doctrine under which changes in the
natural condition of bodies of water are lawful so long as
they cause no harm."
16. For inclusion of such an approach among a list of possible alternatives
which might be pursued in eastern riparian doctrine states, see Marquis,
Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws, 23 TENN.
L. REV. 797, 833 (1955) and Lugar, Water Rights Law and Management
in West Virginia, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SERIES No. 4, WEST VIRGINIA CENTER FOR

APPALACHIAN STUDIES 50 (1967).

For approval of such an approach see

CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958).

17. Hearings Before the New York Temporary State Gomm'n. on Water Resources Planning, N.Y. Leg. Doec. No. 15, at 145 (1964).
18. Smith v. City of Rochester, 38 Hun 612 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1886), aff'd 104 N.Y.
674 (1887); Neal v. City of Rochester, 156 N.Y. 213, 50 N.E. 803 (1898);
Townsend v. Bell, 62 Hun 306 (N.Y. 1891); New York Rubber Co. v.
Rothery, 132 N.Y. 293, 30 N.E. 841 (1892); Gilzinger v. Saugerties Water
Co., 66 Hun 173 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1892); a/f'd on opinion below, 142 N.Y. 633,
37 N.E. 566 (1894); Standen v. New Rochelle Water Co., 91 Hun 272, 36
N.Y.S. 92 (1895); Amsterdam Knitting Co. v. Dean, 162 N.Y. 278, 6 N.E.
757 (1900); Mann v. Willey, 51 A.D. 169, 64 N.Y.S. 589 (1900), aff'd 168
N.Y. 644, 61 N.E. 1131 (1901); Storm King Paper Co., Inc. v. Firth Carpet
Co., 184 A.D. 514, 172 N.Y.S. 33 (1918).
19. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS at 324 (1939).
20. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS at 345-6 (1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

163-6 (Casner ed. 1954); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 712 (1962);.50 IOWA
L. REV. 141, 143 (1964).
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There were, to be sure, New York cases pointing toward
an opposite conclusion. Prominent among these was Knauth
v. Erie ..1? which held that a harmless use, even if on
non-riparian land, was not actionable and therefore could
not begin to serve as a foundation for a prescriptive privilege
until it had become harmful. There were also a few decisions
to the effect that a harmful use of stream water would be
lawful, if reasonable under all the circumstances ;22 a doctrine
which seems basically inconsistent with the view that a harmless use is illegal if it involves an alteration in the natural
condition of a body of water. And then there was McCann
v. Chasm Power Co."3 in which the court suspended an injunction against a harmless alteration until it should become
harmful. But as none of the opinions in these cases made
any attempt to explain the relation between their holdings
and the cases in which injunctions against harmless alterations were granted, the New York law as to the legality of
such alterations was obviously in an uncertain state as of
1965.
Necessity for Precautionary Suits
Since the injunctions against harmless alterations were
founded in part on the erroneous notion that such relief was
necessary to the protection of the plaintiff against the acquisition of a prescriptive privilege by the defendant, 4 there
was uncertainty despite the holding in Knauth, as to whether
or not a prudent riparian owner should bring a precautionary
action against any person effecting an alteration in the body
of water to which the prudent owner's land was riparian,
21. 219 A.D. 83, 219 N.Y.S. 206 (1926).
22. Bullard v. Saratoga Victory Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 525 (1879); Pierson v.
Speyer, 178 N.Y. 270, 70 N.E. 799 (1904).
23. 211 N.Y. 301, 105 N.E. 416 (1914).
24. See the Townsend, New York Rubber and Amsterdam cases, supra note 18.
In view of the basic rule that the claimant of a prescriptive privilege must
show that his activity was wrongful and gave the person against whom the
privilege is claimed a cause of action during the prescriptive period [Adams
v. Van Alstyne, 25 N.Y. 232 (1862); Merriam v. 352 West 42nd St. Corp.,
14 A.D.2d 383, 221 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1961)- 4 TiPFANY, REAL PROPERTY 556,
575, 595 (3d ed. 1939); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY comment e § 458 (1944);
3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 447 (1952)], it follows that it is not necessary
for a court to hold that a party has a cause of action in order to protect
him against prescription. ". . . to say that an action must be given the
riparian to prevent prescription running against him, under the American
law of prescription is to put the cart before the horse. If the cause of action
is not given prescription will not run." Bingham, California Law of Riparian
Rights, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 251, 259 (1934). Accord, 3 TIFFANY, REAL PEOPERTY 126 (3d ed. 1939).
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even though the alteration was at the time harmless to him.
For the prudent riparian to live under the shadow of this
uncertainty involved hardship for him and a conflict with
the policy against unnecessary litigation. If he were aware
of the uncertainty he might feel constrained to bring an
action, to the expense of which he as an unharmed riparian

ought not to be put, and with which the courts ought not to
be burdened. On the other hand, if he were ignorant of the
rule creating the hazard, as he well might be, he probably
would not sue; but if he did not, he might later find that his
riparian interest had been impaired by prescription."5
By providing that a harmless alteration in a body of
water, however effected, and whether for the benefit of
riparian or nonriparian land, should not be actionable, and
could not supply the cause of action essential to the initiation
of prescription,2 6 section 429-j not only resolved the uncertainties above referred to, but disposed of them in a way
consistent with the reasonable use version of the riparian
doctrine, 7 thus encouraging harmless uses of water, and
making it unnecessary for unharmed riparian owners to

institute precautionary

litigation to protect themselves

against prescriptive privileges. The section also has the
effect of overruling Smith v. City of Rochester and Neal v.
25. It was so held in Messinger's Appeal, 109 Pa. 285, 4 A. 162 (1885).
26. For a recommendation that Illinois adopt a statute of this type, see CRIBBET,
ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958).

27. "The most significant election . . . is between the two distinct theories of
the riparian right-that of natural flow and that of reasonable use."
Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriation Rights, 33 TEXAS
L. REv. 24, 36 (1954). The natural flow version has been sharply criticized.
"[T]he legal right of action of a riparian who has suffered no damage is
an anachronism." Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the California
Law of Riparian Rights, 22 CALIF. L. REv. 251, 260 (1934). In 1964 this
version was characterized as "rigid, illogical and senseless" by Edward L.
Ryan, then Legal Consultant to the New York Temporary State Commission
on Water Resources Planning. See Hearings Before the New York Temporary Comm'n. on Water Resources Planning, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15, at
140-41 (1964). See also 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 357, 392 (1962) criticizing the natural flow version as making it too easy for the first riparian
user to acquire a prescriptive privilege, and so to hinder shifts in the water
use pattern necessitated by changes in the relative urgency of the various
needs for water. The reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine under
which harmless alterations are lawful and riparian owners with a dog-inmanger attitude cannot insist on waste of the water [Haar & Gordon,
Riparian Water Rights vs. A Prior Appropriation System, 38 B.U.L. REV.
202, 246 (1958)], is the one preferred by the American Law Institute
[4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS Ch. 41 (1939)], and is supported by the weight
of authority in states in which riparian rights are recognized. [6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 162 (Casner ed. 1954); CRIBBRET, ILLINOIS WATER
RIGHTS LAW 4 (1958); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 712 (1962)]. For a
rceommendation that states whose courts have not already chosen the
reasonable use version adopt it by legislation, see CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER
RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958).
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City of Rochester 8 which enjoined diversion of stream water,
even though the defendant was preventing harm to the plaintiff by adding enough water from another source to compensate for its diversion. Thus it will be possible henceforth
for the New York courts to adopt the western practice of
working out "physical solutions" in water cases;29 at least
where such solutions involve no harm to the parties on whom
they are imposed. That the statute should, therefore, be of
benefit to New York riparians as a group, and to the people
of the State of New York generally because of the increased
utilization of the water resources of the state which it should
encourage, seems clear."
This new statute should, moreover, be of benefit to governmental bodies, agencies or officials charged with the
formulation and execution of plans for the protection and
augmentation of the New York water supplies; for they can
proceed on the assumption that no project can be blocked
by a riparian owner unless he can show that he would be
harmed by its execution. That this is a practical rather than
a merely theoretical benefit is shown by the situation revealed
in a preliminary engineering study of a proposed project to
stabilize the flow of Flint Creek in central New York: viz.,
that riparian owners located more than a certain number of
miles downstream from the projected dam would not be
affected by it to any extent whatever. The practical consequence of section 429-j in such a case would be that the
28. See supra note 16.
29. As to the legality, frequency and value of physical solutions, see Trelease,
Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights, 33 TEXAs L. REv. 24,
38 (1954) Hutchins, Irrigation Water Rights in California, CIRCULAR 452
REvisE), CALIF. AGRIC. ExPER. STATION 40 (1967); 1 ROGERS & NICHOLS,
WATER FOR CALIFORNIA §§ 359, 404, 441 (1967).
30. It should be noted that § 429-j provides that it shall not affect any power
which the state or its municipalities may have to enjoin an alteration in the
natural condition of a body of water. It follows that if it actually was the
law prior to the enactment of § 429-j that the state or a municipality could
enjoin a harmless alteration, that law is still in force. Among the considerations tending to justify the inclusion of this exceptive provision are
the following. The fact that the stream protection law [N.Y. CoNsERv. LAW
§§ 429-a to 429-g (1966)] does not in terms make proof of harm essential
to the establishment of a violation indicates that the legislature believes
that certain acts should be prohibited unless a permit is obtained, even
though they might be initially harmless, because of the possibility that
they would ultimately prove to be prejudicial to the interests of the people
in the waters of the state. Moreover, this exemption served to allay the
apprehension of the Conference of Mayors that without it the interests of
municipalities in the waters of the state might be insufficiently protected.
And finally, the exemption is consistent with the policy long followed in New
York of treating public water supply as a special field to be governed by
legislation primarily designed to deal with problems in that field rather
than by legislation of a more general nature.
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planners would not need to take the riparian rights of the
far downstream owners into account."
Constitutionality of Harmless Use Law
If it actually was the New York law prior to the enactment of section 429-j that a riparian owner had a right that
the natural condition of a stream or lake should not be
altered even harmlessly,32 it follows that the provision of
the section legalizing harmless use, if enforced, would deprive
a riparian owner of part of his riparian interest, and without
compensation. But a holding that this provision of the section
is nevertheless constitutional, at least when applied to harmless alterations made after the effective date of the statute,"
can be anticipated with reasonable confidence, despite the
fact that the extent of a state's police power has never been
accurately defined. 4 It is well settled that the uncompensated
diminution of a property right is effected with the due process of law required by the due process clauses 5 if it is
accomplished by a valid exercise of the state's police power."
31. Section 429-j can also probably be credited with the creation of two riparian
rights new to New York: (1) a right that the view from riparian land
shall not be unreasonably interfered with (a right recognized in Florida
[Maloney & Plager, Florida'sLakes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 42 (1960)]; but
twice denied in New York [Crance v. State, 205 Misc. 590, 128 N.Y.S.2d
479; 284 A.D. 750, 136 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1954) ; aff'd on appeal 309 N.Y. 680,
128 N.E.2d 324 (1955) and Keinz v. State, 2 A.D.2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1956), leave to app. to Ct. of App. denied, 3 A.D.2d 815, case 9, 161 N.Y.S.2d
608 (1957)] ; and (2) a right that the beauty of the prospect from riparian
land should not be unreasonably impaired [a right denied in West VirginiaInternational Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944)and apparently denied in New York in Crance and Keinz]. While § 429-j
does not in express terms purport to create these new rights, it appears
to do so by implication. A Cornell Water Resources Center study now in
course of preparation will contain a discussion of the validity of this
conclusion.
32. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
33. The question as to whether the provision legalizing harmless alterations
could be applied to such an alteration made prior to the effective date of
§ 429-j will be discussed in a Cornell Water Resources Center study now
in course of preparation. If a riparian owner contesting such enforcement
had effected a harmless alteration many years ago, and if the law was
that it was wrongful when he began it, he could argue that to legalize it
now would be to deprive him without compensation of a fully matured
prescriptive privilege, the exercise of which he should be entitled to continue, even though such exercise was not causing harm to others.
34. As to the undefined limits of the police power, see Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); Village of Euclid v. Ambler,
272 U.S. 365, 387, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
36. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L.
REV. 696, 608 (1954) ; 11 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.26 (3d
ed. rev. 1964); O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19 Cal.
App. 2d 61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941); Twentieth Century Associates, Inc. v.
Waldman, 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 696
(1945); Moore V. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, case 2 (Ky. 1964); Knight
v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).
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When determining whether a particular statute constitutes a valid exercise of the police power, the courts have
treated numerous factors as having significant bearing on
the question: viz., whether the statute completely destroys
the property interest of the person attacking it; whether the
statute confers on such a party benefits which to an appreciable degree offset what he loses by the statute's diminution
of his interest; whether the extent and importance of the
public interest to be served by the statute outweighs any
unfairness, disappointment of reasonable expectation or
financial loss to which the statute would subject the owner of
the property interest if it were held valid; and whether the
statute involves an impairment of a private property interest
to enhance the economic value of some governmental enterprise, or to improve the public condition by the resolution
of conflicts among private property owners.8 7
Viewed in the light of these factors, the harmless use
provision of section 429-j would clearly constitute a valid
exercise of the police power. The power of which it purports
to deprive a riparian owner-the power to obtain an injunction when he is not harmed or threatened with immediate
harm-constitutes but a small and relatively insignificant
fraction of his riparian property interest; a fraction which
will not be necessary under the section to protect him from
prescriptive impairment of his riparian rights and privileges
in the future.8 " One offset against this inconsequential lossif any offset is deemed necessary-is the relief which the
section affords the riparian owner when the shoe is on the
other foot from the possible necessity of bringing precautionary suits against parties effecting harmless alterations."
Another offsetting advantage which the harmless alteration
37. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HAiv.
L. REv. 943, 966 (1927) ; Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and
Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 609 (1954) ; Dunham, A Legal and Economic
Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 663-69 (1958); Hochman,
The Supreme Court & the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36, 67 (1964); Trelease, Policies for Water Law, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J.
1, 35 (1964); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1165, 1223, 1233 (1967); Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse
Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 761
(1967); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Bacich v.
Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943); Shepard v. Village
of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949); Moore v. Ward, 377
S.W.2d 881, case 2 (Ky. 1964).
38. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
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provision confers upon riparian owners becomes apparent
when it is noted that if they may be hindered by it when
they appear in the role of plaintiff, they may be helped by
it when, because of water-connected activities, their adversaries cast them in the role of defendant. Moreover, this
provision will not subject most riparians to disappointment
of legitimate expectations. The power to sue though not
harmed or threatened with harm is not one on the existence
of which a riparian owner would normally rely when buying
his riparian land. If an atypical riparian owner acquired his
land primarily for the purpose of extorting a price for a
release of his power to obtain an injunction though not
harmed, a conclusion that the frustration of this purpose
was unfair to him would scarcely seem justified."0 The public
interest in avoiding waste of water and in encouraging its
maximum utilization which the provision serves clearly outweighs any loss to the riparian owner. It also seems evident
that the destruction of the power to sue when not harmed
involves an improvement of the public condition by resolution
of conflict between private persons, rather than an enhancement of the economic value of a governmental enterprise.
And finally, it should be noted when considering the
validity of this provision as a police power measure, that
there is available guidance more definite and certain than
that afforded by any of the criteria above referred to. As
of 1928, because of apparently conflicting judicial decisions,
there was uncertainty in California as to whether a riparian
owner had power to prevent appropriation of water for which
he had no reasonable use by a person basing his claim of the
privilege of doing so on the prior appropriation laws of that
state. 1 The subject matter of this uncertainty was substantially similar to that of the uncertainty existing in New
40. Where defendant's tort is causing plaintiff little or no harm, and plaintiff
therefore has nothing substantial to gain from an injunction except the
power to extort from the defendant a price for a release of plaintiff's right,
the court is likely to refuse injunctive relief. Edwards v. Allouez Mining
Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878); Haber v. Paramount Ice Corp., 239 A.D. 324, 267
N.Y.S. 349 (1933), aff'd 264 N.Y. 98, 190 N.E. 163 (1934); Johnson v.
Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 24 So. 2d 345 (1946). Holdings in accord with this
tendency would seem to furnish analogical support for the conclusion that
a statute which deprives a riparian owner of nothing except the power to
extort a price for the release of a power to sue although not harmed, is not
unfair to the riparian owner and does not depirve him of an expectation
worthy of legal protection.
41. Trelease, Coordinationof Riparian and Appropriative Rights, 33 TFxAS L.
REV. 24, 37 (1954).
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York as of 1965: viz., as to whether a riparian owner had
power to prevent an alteration in a stream or lake which was
causing him no harm.2 To resolve the California uncertainty,
a section was added to the California constitution limiting
riparian rights "to such water as is reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served" and declaring that "such
right does not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.''" Under this section a riparian owner could
not complain of a use of water so long as it caused him no
actual damage. 4 When it was attacked in Chow v. City of
Santa Barbara" as in contravention of the provision of the
14th amendment to the federal constitution forbidding the
taking of property without due process of law, it was upheld
"as a measure adopted in the exercise of the police power." 6
Since the harmless alteration provision of section 429-j would,
if upheld, have substantially the same effect as the section
added to the California constitution, Chow would be an
authority squarely in point and in favor of the validity of
the provision should its constitutionality ever be called in
question. 7 It seems likely, therefore, that section 429-j will
be found to have provided solutions for some of New York's
water problems without having caused any substantial uncompensated impairment of property rights.
UNCERTAINTIES DEALT WITH IN PROPOSED HARMFUL USE

BILL

Substantially Harmful but Reasonable Uses
There are, of course, as already indicated, numerous
uncertainties in New York riparian law which continue to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
Trelease, supra note 41.
Id.
217 Cal. App. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
Id.
The fact that the decision in Chow was in regard to the validity of a constitutional provision rather than of a statutory provision legalizing harmless
uses should not prevent a party asserting the validity of the harmless
alteration provision in § 429-j from relying on Chow for support. Since a
provision in a state constitution is as much subject to the federal constitution
as is a state statute [Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131, 135
(1885) ; Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 607, 127 N.E. 525 (1920)],
a state statute should be subjected to no more stringent scrutiny than that
to which a state constitutional provision is subjected when attacked as
invalid under the 14th amendment to the federal constitution. It should
be noted that the court in upholding the California constitutional provision
in the Chow case did not rely on its being such rather than a statute, but
on its constitutionality under the 14th amendment as a valid exercise of
the state's police power. 22 P.2d at 17-18.
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exist despite the enactment of section 429-j of the Conservation Law,48 and which should be resolved for the encouragement of private riparian owners contemplating water-based
projects, and to prepare the way for multi-purpose governmental water protection and supply projects."9 Among these
is the uncertainty as to whether a water-connected activity
which involves substantial harm to riparian owners other
than the actor is unreasonable as a matter of law because of
such harm and therefore illegal, or whether such an activity
can, despite its substantially harmful character, be found to
be reasonable under all the circumstances, and therefore lawful. Doubt concerning this point has been created by New
York judicial utterances difficult to reconcile."
It would seem desirable to have this uncertainty resolved
by legislation providing that an alteration in the natural
condition of a body of water should be lawful, even though
it causes substantial harm, if the alteration is reasonable
under all the facts and circumstances. If the contrary position is taken, there will be situations in which the riparian
owner who first exercises his riparian rights will acquire a
permanent advantage over a riparian who is not in a position
to develop his riparian land as quickly. Thus, if A begins to
irrigate, withdrawing X gallons daily for use on his riparian
land; if B, higher up on the stream, thereafter begins to irrigate, withdrawing Y gallons daily for use on his riparian
land; if B's withdrawals leave available for A only X minus
Y gallons; if X minus Y equals one-half of X gallons; and if
A's crop is substantially reduced because A can now obtain
only half the water originally available to him, B's alteration
48. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
50. With Bullard v. Saratoga Victory Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 525, 530 (1879) in
which the court said: "There is no question upon the facts in this case
that the manner of using canals by the defendant is a serious injury to
the plaintiff," and yet affirmed a judgment for the defendant, and with
Henderson Estate Co. v. Carroll Elec. Co., 113 A.D. 775, 99 N.Y.S. 365
(1906), aff'd 189 N.Y. 531, 82 N.E. 1127 (1907) in which the court said
"The test is whether the use is reasonable, not whether possible injury
may result," compare City of N.Y. v. Blum, 208 N.Y. 237, 243, 101 N.E.
869 (1913) in which the court said: "The defendant had the right temporarily to detain or divert the waters of Pine's stream, but the lower
riparian owners . . . had the right to have that water returned in its
natural state, save for such slight diminution or pollution as might necessarily occur from a reasonable use," and held for the plaintiff. Although
the holdings in Bullard and Henderson are reconcilable with that in Blum
because the harm inflicted in Bullard and Henderson was not, the passage
quoted from Blum could obviously be used as a basis for the contention
that activity causing more than slight harm is unreasonable as a matter
of law.
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of the stream by his withdrawal of Y gallons daily will

clearly have caused A substantial harm, and would therefore
appear to be unlawful under a rule that an alteration in the

natural condition of a body of water which causes substantial
harm to another riparian owner is wrongful.

It is submitted that the result which would apparently
follow in this hypothetical case under such a restrictive rule
affords evidence of the undesirability of the rule. In the

first place, such a result would be in conflict with several
basic principles of the riparian doctrine: viz., that priority
in time does not necessarily create priority in right;"1 that

riparian rights are not lost by non-use ;5" and that the extent
of riparian rights varies from time to time in response to
changes in the situation'-in the hypothetical case, the situation changed when B began to irrigate. In the second place,
the result which would be arrived at in the hypothetical case
under the restrictive rule would tend toward an undesirable
rigidity in the pattern of water use, which would make it
difficult to satisfy important new water needs as they arose
from time to time.
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 853 comment h (1939); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
417 (3d ed. 1939) ; 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 159 (Casner ed. 1954).
52. 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 159 (Casner ed. 1954); CRIBBET, ILLINOIS
WATER RIGHTS LAW 42 (1958); Trelease, Law, Water and People, 18 Wyo.
L.J. 3, 4 (1963); Lugar, Water Rights Law and Management in West
Virginia, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SERIES No. 4, W. VA. CENTER FOR APPALACHIAN
STUDIES 21 (1967); Hutchins, Irrigation Water Rights in California, CiRCULAR 452 REVISED, CALIF. AGRIC. EXPER. STATION 13 (1967); Petraborg v.
Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W.2d 174, 181 (1944). Among the New York
cases recognizing this rule are Townsend v. Bell, 62 Hun 306 (N.Y. 1891);
Gilzinger v. Saugerties Water Co., 66 Hun 173 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1892); aff'd on
opinion below, 142 N.Y. 633, 37 N.E. 566 (1894); Mann v. Willey, 51 A.D.
169, 64 N.Y.S. 589 (1900), aff'd 168 N.Y. 664, 61 N.E. 1131 (1901).
53. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the California Law of Riparian
Rights, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 251, 258 (1934); WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW
(Ch. by Lauer) 210 (1958); CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 28
(1958); RARER & BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES (ch. by Haar & Gordon) 215 (1958); Beuseher, AppropriationWater
Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 448, 449
(1961); Maloney, Eastern Laws ConcerningMinimum Stream Flows, PAPERS
SOUTHEASTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE 301 (1961); O'Connell, Iowa's New

Water Statute-The Constitutionalityof Regulating Existing Uses of Water,
47 IOWA L. REV. 549, 577 (1962) ; Trelease & Lee, Transfer of Water Rights,
1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 4 (1966); 1966 WiS. L. REV. 942, 943; Lugar,
Water Rights Law and Management in West Virginia, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SERIES No. 4, WEST VIRGINIA CENTER FOR APPALACHIAN STUDIES 21

(1967);

Hutchins, Irrigation Water Rights in California, CIRCULAR 452 REVISED,
CALIF. AGRiC. ExPER. STATION 18 (1967); Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts 327, 332
(Pa. S. Ct., 1834); Fulton County Gas & Elec. Co. v. Rockwood Mfg. Co.,
238 N.Y. 109, 115, 144 N.E. 359 (1924) ; In re Water Rights in Silvies River,
115 Ore. 27, 237 P. 322, 357 (1925) ; Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549,
150 P.2d 405, 411 (1944) ; Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499,
172 P.2d 1002 (1946); Hoover v. Crane, 363 Mich. 36, 42, 106 N.W.2d 563
(1960). The question as to whether New York should, despite the importance
of reducing the amount of uncertainty in its water law, retain this rule,
is discussed hereinafter. See text accompanying notes 113 to 134 infra.
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Moreover, acceptance of a rule that a use, alteration or
activity which causes substantial harm is unlawful for that
reason alone would automatically exclude from consideration
circumstances which have often been taken into account when
passing upon the reasonableness and legality of a particular
alteration, use, or activity. In other words, the restrictive
rule makes harm to the complaining party a decisive factor
by itself, provided only it is substantial. That harm of such
degree should be and is an important factor when determining
legality cannot be denied;4 but that such harm should be
treated as but one of several important factors contributing
to the final result seems equally clear. 5 There may well be
situations in which a use, alteration or activity should be
held lawful, although causing substantial harm, because of
its importance to the public and defendant's inability to
avoid the harm, 6 or because the plaintiff's activity is unsuited
to the neighborhood,5 7 or because the plaintiff could practicably minimize the harm,5 8 or because the stream comes to
the defendant's tract before reaching the plaintiff's." It is
to be hoped, therefore, that the New York legislature will
pass the bill now pending before it6" and providing in substance in accord with the prevailing view that an alteration
in the natural condition of a body of water is lawful, even
though causing substantial harm, if it is reasonable under
all the circumstances.
Harmful but Reasonable Diversion-Impoundment and
Addition of Foreign Water
Another question in regard to New York riparian law
which remains unanswered despite the enactment of section
429-j of the Conservation Law is the following. If it be
assumed that the New York ]aw has been and still is that
substantially harmful alterations in bodies of water are in
54.
55.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 852 (1939).

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 853, 854

(1939).

56. See Barnard v. Sherly, 135 Ind. 547, 24 L.R.A. 568 (1893).
57. See Michelson v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831 (S. Ct. 1945); aff'd 270 A.D.
1042, 63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1946).
58. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) and
in City of New York v. Blum, 208 N.Y. 237, 101 N.E. 869 (1913).
59. See Henderson Estate Co. v. Carroll Elec. Co., 113 A.D. 775, 99 N.Y.S. 365
(1906), afj'd 189 N.Y. 531, 82 N.E. 1127 (1907).
60. N.Y. Senate No. 882-A, Assembly No. 1571-A (1968). Introduced in the
1968 session at the request of the Joint Legislative Committee on the Conservation, Development and Equitable Use of the Water Resources of the
State.
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general lawful if reasonable, have some exceptions to this
rule been created under which certain particular sorts of
alterations would be unreasonable as a matter of law and
therefore illegal!61 Thus under the New York cases, there

is doubt as to whether a riparian owner, if sued for a substantially harmful diversion," or seasonal impoundment of
a body of water,68 or addition of foreign water64 thereto,65
could hope to secure a judgment in his favor by demonstrating
that his alteration was reasonable despite its particular sort 6
and despite its substantially harmful character. 7 It would
61. That the view implemented in this bill is the prevailing one, see PROSSER,
TORTS 621-23 (3d ed. 1964).
62. Compare the statement in Garwood v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 83 N.Y.
400, 406 (1881) that it is the rule that a riparian owner has no right to
divert any part of the stream into an accustomed course "for any purpose"
to the prejudice of another riparian proprietor, with the holdings in Smith
v. City of Rochester, 38 Hun 612 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1886), aff'd 104 N.Y. 674
(1887) and Neal v. City of Rochester, 156 N.Y. 213, 50 N.E. 803 (1898)
that diversions of stream water could be enjoined, even though the defendant
was preventing harm to the plaintiff by adding enough water from another
source to compensate for the defendant's diversions, with the following
statement in Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900):
"Consumption by watering cattle, temporary detention by dams in order
to run machinery, irrigation when not out of proportion to the size of the
stream, and some other familiar uses, although in fact a diversion of the
water causing some loss, are not regarded as an unlawful diversion . . . the
lower owners must submit to such loss as is caused by reasonable use."
Evidence of the doubt which exists as to the present legality of harmful
but reasonable diversion of stream water in New York is afforded by an
objection lodged against the harmful use bill when it was before the 1967
session of the legislature on the ground that it would change the New York
common law under which a substantially harmful diversion could not be
justified by a plea of reasonableness.
63. The holdings and dicta in Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 7 Am. Rep. 373
(1871), Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900), and
Fulton County Gas & Elec. Co. v. Rockwood Mfg. Co., 238 N.Y. 109, 144
N.E. 359 (1924) leave the state of the New York law as to the legality of
seasonal impoundment of stream water in an uncertain condition. In this
connection, the interpretation put upon Clinton in Seneca Consol. Gold Mines
Co. v. Great Western Power Co., 209 Cal. App. 206, 287 P. 93 (1930) is
of special interest. Seasonal impoundments have been legalized by statute
in several states to varying degrees and subject to various conditions. See,
e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1301 to -1315 (1947) ; KY. REv. STAT. § 262.690
(1962) ; and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62-94.1 to -94.12 (1950). For a recommendation that Illinois legalize seasonal impoundment by legislation, see CRIBBET,
ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 51 (1958).
64. That is, water from a source not naturally tributary to the body of water
to which it is added.
65. See the dicta in Waffle v. New York Cent. R.R., 53 N.Y. 11 (1873);
McCormick v. Horan, 81 N.Y. 86 (1880); and Kennedy v. Hoog, Inc., 48
Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606 (S. Ct., 1964); aff'd in part and rev. in
part sub nomn., Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 26 A.D.2d 768, 271
N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966). The wording of the Appellate Division opinion in
Kennedy leaves it uncertain as to whether it approved or disapproved the
dictum in McCormick in regard to the addition of foreign water which had
been quoted by the trial court in Kennedy. As there appear to be no New
York judicial holdings or utterances in conflict with these dicta, a risk
that they might be followed in actual holdings clearly exists.
66. A court adhering to the natural flow version of the riparian doctrine
would, of course, be likely to hold that any of these three sorts of alteration
would be illegal, even if harmless.
67. Under N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 429-j (1966), all of the alterations referred
to would be lawful, if harmless.
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seem clear that the resolution of this uncertainty would be
desirable for the guidance of private riparian owners and
governmental units or agencies contemplating embarkation
upon water-connected projects. And since the optimum development and use of water resources, whether by private persons or by government, often requires harmful diversion,
impoundment or addition of foreign water, it would seem
equally clear that the resolving legislation should provide
in substance, as does the harmful use bill now before the
New York legislature, that no harmful alteration in a body
of water shall be held unreasonable and unlawful merely
because it would involve diversion, seasonal impoundment,
or addition of foreign water, or any other particular sort
of alteration.
Relevancy of the Public Interest when
Determining Reasonableness
Because of the scarcity and conflicting nature of the
available judicial authority, another uncertainty exists in
New York riparian law despite the enactment of section 429-j
of the Conservation Law: viz., as to whether a trier of fact,
when passing on the reasonableness of competing waterconnected activities, can take into account their relative importance to the public. 8 There appears to be but one New
York Court opinion containing language which might be
construed as relevant to this question. In Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co., the court said: "the courts will not overlook the needs
of important manufacturing interests,"9 but as the court
added almost immediately that the courts "will not permit
substantial injury . . . for the purpose of enabling a new

and great industry to flourish," it is difficult to draw a
definite conclusion as to what the New York rule is on the
point in question. Although the relevance of a comparison
of the importance to the public of the activities of the contesting parties to the reasonableness issue in water cases has
68. While the New York courts have taken the public interest into account
when deciding whether or not a defendant clearly liable at law for damages
shall be enjoined from continuing his wrongful conduct [Squaw Island
Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937);
Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936)], such
cases cannot, of course, be cited as authority for the proposition that the
importance to the public of a party's activity can be considered when
deciding whether or not he is liable at law for damages.
69. 164 N.Y. 303; 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
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been widely recognized,70 and although the New York courts
have taken that factor into account when passing on the
issue of reasonableness in the general field of nuisance,"' and
so in view of the absence of New York authority clearly to
the contrary, 2 might be expected to concur in the position
taken in the water field elsewhere, it would seem advisable
to resolve this uncertainty by legislation providing in sub70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 853, 854 (1939) ; HAER & BERGEN, WATER ALLO-

IN THE EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Haar & Gordon) 7 (1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); Mizell v.
McGowan, 129 N.C. 93, 39 S.E. 729 (1901); Mason v. Whitney, 193 Mass.
152, 78 N.E. 881, 7 L.N.S. 289 (1906); Board of Drainage Comm'nrs. of
Dist. No. 10 v. Board of Drainage Comm'nrs. of Washington County, 130
Miss. 764, 95 So. 75, 28 A.L.R. 1250 (1923); Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82,
286 S.W. 458 (1926) ; Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W.2d 174
(1944) ; Montgomery Limestone Co. v. Bearden, 256 Ala. 269, 54 So. 2d 571
(1951); Joslin v. Marin Munic. Water Dist., 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d
889 (1967).
71. See Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Term. R.R., 140 N.Y. 267; 35 N.E. 592, 24
L.R.A. 105 (1893).
72. Even though the court's refusal in Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.E. 303,
58 N.E. 142 (1900) and in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1,
101 N.E. 805 (1913) to hold the defendants' pollution of streams lawful,
despite the size of their payrolls, and the court's rejection in Strobel of the
doctrine of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886)
that the relative importance to the public of a particular industry could be
taken into account when passing on the legality of its polluting activities,
undoubtedly affords some basis for the contention that the relative importance to the public of the defendant's activity and of the activities of the
riparians complaining of his activity cannot be taken into account in New
York when passing upon the reasonableness of defendant's activity, it
should be borne in mind that the question as to the relevance of this
comparison apparently was never actually before the court in either Strobel
or Whalen, because in neither case did the court refer to any evidence
offered to show that the defendant's activities (salt manufacture in Strobel
and paper making in Whalen) were of greater public importance in New
York than the plaintiff's activities (general manufacturing in Strobel and
agriculture in Whalen). It could be argued, therefore, that these cases
stand for no more than the obviously sound proposition that a defendant cannot establish the reasonableness of his activity as against a plaintiff merely
by showing that his operation and investment are of greater magnitude
than the plaintiff's. Nor did the defendant's liability for damages for
interference with the plaintiff's percolating water supply in Forbell v.
City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644, 51 L.R.A. 695 (1900) appear
to have been based on the view that the public interest can never have
relevance when determining reasonableness, but rather on the court's conclusion that it was more just to require a city having the power of eminent
domain to spread the cost of its water supply over its citizens by taxation
than to deprive individual water rights owners of their water supply without compensation [see Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and
Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1954)]; a conclusion amply supported by
New York authority [Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162
(1816); Gray v. Village of Ft. Plain, 105 A.D. 215, 94 N.Y.S. 698 (1905) ;
Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936) ; Squaw
Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d
10 (1937)] and consistent with the widely entertained view that when
private rights are impaired in furtherance of a public enterprise, compensation must be given. Dunham, A Legal & Economic Basis for City
Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 663-69 (1958); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964); Trelease, Policies for Water,
5 NATUnAL RESOURCES J. 1, 35 (1965). The salutary rule established by
these cases would not be changed by the pending harmful use bill; for it
provides that none of its sections shall be construed as increasing or decreasing the rights, privileges and powers with respect to bodies of water of the
State of New York or of any county, city, town or village therein.
CATION
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stance that this factor may be taken into account when deciding the issue of reasonableness. The harmful use bill, now
before the New York legislature, includes such a provision;
and also declares in accord with the Restatement of Torts "
and the New York common law, that consideration may also
be given to the relative suitability to the region and to the
body of water involved of the parties' respective activities ;7"
to the amount of harm which each would suffer from a
decision adverse to him ;7" to the relative availability to the
parties of practicable means of minimizing or avoiding
harm;76 to the location on the body of water of the parties'
points of access thereto ;77 and to the fact as to which party
first began his activity." Knowledge that these factors are
considered relevant to the reasonableness issue should be of
material assistance to private riparian owners when deciding
upon a course of action, and to governmental units or agencies
when formulating and executing public water projects.
Constitutionality of Proposed Harmful Use Bill
If it is presently the law in New York that an alteration
in the natural condition of a body of water or an activity
in connection therewith which causes substantial harm to
another riparian owner can be lawful, if reasonable; that
harmful alteration of a body of water by diversion, seasonal
impoundment, or the addition of foreign water may be found
to be unreasonable but is not unreasonable as a matter of
law; and that the relative importance to the public of the
activities of the contesting parties may be taken into account
when passing on the unreasonableness issue in a water case,"
there can be no doubt as to the constitutionality of the provisions to that effect in the harmful use bill, for the codification of common law rules involves no impairment of common
law rights.
73. Sections 852-54 (1939).
74. Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
75. Michelson v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831 (S.Ct. 1945), aff'd 270 A.D. 1042,
63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1946).
76. City of N.Y. v. Blum, 208 N.Y. 237, 101 N.E. 869 (1913).
77. Henderson Estate Co. v. Carroll Elec. Co., 113 A.D. 775; 99 N.Y.S. 365
(1906), aff'd 189 N.Y. 531, 82 N.E. 1127 (1907).
78. Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900). For the statement that the weight given to this factor in riparian doctrine states is
greater than is generally supposed, see Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law
Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BurFFAO L. REV. 448, 451, 453
(1961).
79. See text accompanying notes 48-78 supra.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/4

20

Farnham: The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law within th

1968

NEW YORK WATER LAW

On the other hand, if the current New York riparian law
is to the contrary on any of these points,"° the harmful use
bill, if enacted and enforced, would deprive riparian owners
of one or more constituent elements of their present riparian
interests. Since the bill makes no provision for compensation
to riparian owners whose riparian interests would be diminished by it under this assumption, it could be argued that a
statute embodying the provisions of the bill would deprive
riparian owners of their property without due process of
law."'
It is submitted, however, that each of the provisions in
the bill which might be found to impair existing common law
rights should be upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power in view of the factors which the courts take into
account when deciding whether a statute constitutes such an
exercise, 2 at least if such provisions are applied only to
alterations or activities begun after the effective date of the
legislation embodying them."5 The diminution in the size of
the riparian interest which the bill would effect-a reduction
in the scope of the right to freedom from substantial harm,
and loss of immunity from the risks incident to having the
public interest taken into account when passing on the reasonableness issue-is relatively small, and is largely offset
by the fact this diminution and this loss would often be
transformed into an increase and a gain whenever a riparian
owner found himself a defendant rather than a plaintiff.
Moreover, such hardship as enforcement of the provisions
of the bill might inflict on any particular riparian owner
would seem to be outweighed by the public interest in the
optimum utilization of the state's water resources which
would be served by those provisions, and in the proper adjustment of the rights and privileges of riparian owners as among
themselves which these provisions would make. Since such
impairment as they might cause is for these purposes rather
than for increasing the economic value of some public enter80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
See text accompanying note 26 supra.
The question as to whether the retrospective application provided for by
the bill would be constitutional will be discussed in a Cornell Water Resources Center study now in course of preparation.
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prise, compensation should not be required for it.84 Analogical

support for this conclusion would seem to be afforded by the
decisions upholding the constitutionality of zoning legislation,8" which involves adjustment of the rights and privileges
of adjoining landowners as among themselves, despite the
losses which such adjustment causes, unless they are so great
as to amount to confiscation." The public interest in an
adjustment of private rights and privileges tending to benefit the majority in the long run is held to outweigh the losses
inflicted on the few. 7 It would seem, therefore, that if the
harmful use bill becomes law, it will, like section 429-j,
provide solutions for some of New York's water problems
without causing any more substantial uncompensated impairment of property rights than has been caused by other legislation which has proved to be generally acceptable to property
owners and the public in New York.8
OTHIER UNDESIRABLE UNCERTAINTIES

Since like section 429-j of the Conservation Law, the
harmful use bill deals with only a few of the uncertainties
in New York riparian law which existed as of 1965, several

of these uncertainties will continue to discourage private
development of the water resources of the state and to compli-

cate the planning and execution of public water projects,
even if the harmful use bill becomes law, unless additional
clarifying legislation is enacted.
84.

85.
86.
87.

88.

Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLUM. L. REV.
650, 663-69 (1958); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
67 (1964); Trelease, Policies for Water, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 35
(1965).
This analogy is suggested in Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements
in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. Rav. 448, 458 (1961).
Johnson v. Apton, 18 N.Y.2d 668, 219 N.E.2d 868 (1966).
The question as to the extent to which the often cited cases of Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) and California-Oregon Power Co.
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555 (1934), aff'd 295 U.S. 142
(1935) tend to establish the constitutionality of the provisions of the harmful use bill, and the question as to whether People v. New York Carbonic
Acid Gas Co., 196 N.Y. 421, 90 N.E. 441 (1909) and Flynn v. New York
W. & B. Ry., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916) would militate against its
constitutionality will be discussed in a Cornell Water Resources Center
study now in course of preparation.
In Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 43, 258 N.Y.S. 229
(1932) the court said: "Property owners, as well as the public, have come
to recognize the absolute necessity of reasonable regulations of this
character in the interest of public health, safety, and general welfare, as
well as for the conservation of property values. Such is the purpose of
our zoning laws." It could be argued then that the property owners and
the public do not view the impairment of property rights effected by
zoning laws as substantial, and that they therefore would not look upon
an analogous impairment of riparian rights as substantial.
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Identification of Riparian Land
Prominent among these still existing uncertainties are
those as to what land can be classified as riparian. While
it has been decided in New York that for land to be so
classified, it must border on a natural body of water ;" that
if it so borders, its owner may lawfully withdraw water from
such body for the generation of power regardless of its
navigability and of the ownership of its bed ;o and that the
owner of such land has the privilege of access to such part
of the water as is navigable, even if the bed is privately
owned,91 numerous questions remain unanswered. For
example, under what circumstances will a conveyance by a
riparian of a strip of land running along his shore cause
the remaining part of the tract to become non-riparian.2 If
a person owns land bordering on a natural body of water,
will all of it be riparian if it extends inland from the water
for several miles, or if part of it lies outside the watershed
of the body of water ? Can a riparian owner increase the
amount of his riparian land by acquiring a contiguous tract
not bordering on the water? Under what conditions, if any,
will the rear part of a riparian tract retain its riparian
character if severed and conveyed by the riparian owner to
another person ?
89. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 228 N.Y. 38, 123
N.E. 200 (1919).
90. Id.
91. Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State of New York, 201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d
964 (1951), aff'd 280 A.D. 1021, case 1, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952); Riveria
Ass'n., Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575, 276 N.Y.S.2d
249, 252 (S. Ct. 1967).
92. See Rumsey v. New York & N.E. R.R., 114 N.Y. 423, 21 N.E. 1066 (1889);
New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. v. Aldridge, 135 N.Y. 82, 32 N.E. 50, 17
L.R.A. 516 (1892); Saunders v. New York Cent. & H.R. R.R., 144 N.Y. 75,
38 N.E. 992, 27 L.R.A. (1894); Crance v. State of New York, 284 A.D. 750,
136 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1954).
93. Apparently several of the questions as to what land is riparian which are
unanswered in New York are also open in various other eastern states.
As to Illinois, see MANN, ELLIS & KRAuSZ, WATER-Usn LAW IN ILLINOIS
18 (1964). It has been recommended that Illinois enact a statute defining
riparian land. CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958). VA. CODE
ANN. § 62-94.1 et seq. appears to permit a riparian owner to buy adjoining
non-riparian land, and by so doing to make the added land riparian, provided it lies within the watershed. See Ellis, Water Rights & Legislation in
the Eastern States 16 (paper presented at the ATLANTA WATER RESOURCES
CONFERENCE OF 1965). As to Kentucky, see Clay, Kentucky Law on Water,
RESEARCH REPORT No. 25, Ky. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N 2 (1965).
As to Maryland, see Galbreath, Maryland Water Law, UNIV. OF MD. WATER
RESOURCES STUDY COMMITTEE 6 (1965). As to Massachusetts, see HABER &
BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Haar & Gordon)
19 (1958). As to Michigan, see HABER & BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN
THE EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Arens) 380 (1958). The question as to whether
a part of a riparian tract can retain its riparian character after being
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Classification of Domestic Uses
Another uncertainty in New York riparian law now
existing because of scarcity of authority which was not clarified by section 429-j of the Conservation Law, and which
would not be resolved by enactment of the harmful use bill,
is as to what uses of water can be classified as domestic.
While despite this scarcity of authority it probably would
be safe to assume that in New York as elsewhere use of
stream or lake water by a riparian owner and his family
for drinking, cooking, sanitation and for watering the number
of domestic animals needed to supply the family table with
meat, milk and eggs would be classified as domestic,9 4 although
use for the irrigation of commercial crops would not be, 5
there appears to be no New York authority as to whether
any of the following uses could qualify as domestic: irrigation of enough land to supply the needs of the riparian family
for fruit, grain and vegetables; the supply of water to animals
being raised for market or kept for the production of eggs
or milk for sale; maintenance of ponds fed by stream or lake
water for family food supply and recreation; operation of
air-conditioning units in the riparian home; and use for
drinking, cooking and sanitation in hospitals, military installatons, motels, children's camps, and similar institutions
located on riparian land. The degree of uncertainty as to
how New York would classify these uses is increased by the
scarcity of authority in other states, and by conflicts on
some points among the few authorities available." Statutory
definitions of domestic use have been enacted in other states.97
deprived of contact with the water by severance was answered in the
affirmative in Thompson v. Enz, 2 Mich. Ct. App. 404, 140 N.W.2d 563
(1966). As to Missouri, see MANN, McLARNEY, ANGLE & MILLER, WATERUSE LAW IN MISSOURI 30 (1965).
As to North Carolina, see HABER &
BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Ellis) 207 (1958).
As to West Virginia, see Lugar, Water Rights Law and Management in
West Virginia, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SERIES No. 4, WEST VIRGINIA CENTER FOR
APPALACHIAN STUDIES 19 (1967).
94. 5 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 357 (1962).
95. Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
96. In regard to the question as to what uses are domestic, see, in addition to

the authorities cited in notes 94 and 95, 6A

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

165 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Trelease, Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use, 12
Wyo. L.J. 1, 2-5 (1957); Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in
Riparian Doctrine States, 10 Bus'rALo L. REv. 448, 452 (1961); Salem Flour
Mills Co. v. Lord, 42 Ore. 82, 69 P. 1033 (1902); Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa.
Super. 362 (1903); Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 98 P. 1083 (1909);
Cowell v. Armstrong, 210 Cal. 218, 290 P. 1036 (1930); McCord v. Big
Brothers Movement, Inc., 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 A. 480 (1936); Prather v.
Hoberg, 24 Cal.2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944).
97. For a recent example, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 6102(a) (1966).
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Transferability of Riparian Rights
Another uncertainty existing in New York riparian law
because of scarcity of authority, and with which neither
section 429-j nor the harmful use bill purports to deal, is as
to which riparian rights and privileges are transferable, and
with what effect. While it has been held in New York that
the privilege to use water for power9" and the privilege of
access to navigable water"9 are transferable either with or
without the riparian land to which they were originally incident, and that in such cases the extent of the interest which
the transferee receives is determined by the extent of the
interest possessed by his transferor,"' there appears to be
no New York authority on the question as to whether other
kinds of riparian rights and privileges, such as the consumptive privilege of use for irrigation, are transferable. It is
possible that the New York courts, if faced with the question,
would hold that consumptive riparian privileges are transferable; particularly since the rationale of United Paper
Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co.,"' in which it was
held that the privilege of use for power is transferable, so
closely resembles that of Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.1"2
holding that the privilege of withdrawing stream water for
use in oil drilling operations, which under the facts of the
case amounted to a consumptive use, was transferable to a
non-riparian. However, in view of suggestions by writers
and courts that consumptive riparian privileges are not
98. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123
N.E. 200 (1913); FPC v. Niagara Mowawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239
(1953).
99. City of New York v. Third Ave. Ry., 294 N.Y. 238, 62 N.E.2d 52 (1945).
100. "The right to the use of the water of a flowing stream . .. is a valuable
property right which can be severed from the riparian land by grant ...
Thomson and Dix . .. had a mere usufructuary right in it, subjected to
the right of the state and rights equal with theirs in the owners of the
opposite . .. bank. Their usufructuary and proprietary right was . . . to
draw . . . water, for the purpose of power, in such quantity at any time
as would not conflict with the right of the state or other riparian owners,
to be returned to the river before it left their land, in a manner reasonable
and safe to the lower proprietors. Such right as an entirety or any part
of it they could grant." United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper
Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123 N.E. 200 (1913).
101. Id.
102. 179 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946). In this case the court said: "[T]he
defendant company was not without right, but it was a derivative right.
Hence the standard for measuring the legality of the company's act is the
extent of the right of the riparian owner who granted it." Accord, State v.
Appelbacher, 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 244 (1918).
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transferable,0 3 there is a real possibility that the New York
courts, while standing by decisions already made, would deny
the transferability of consumptive privileges. Since economists and lawyers are generally agreed that no system of
water law can be deemed acceptable unless it makes satisfactory provision for the transfer of water rights and privileges because such provision affords one of the best means
of effecting revisions in the pattern of water use in response
to changes in the relative importance of the various demands
for water,0 it would seem clear that New York should enact
legislation declarative of the transferability and severability
of riparian rights and privileges, and indicative of the effect
of such transfers." 5
The task of drafting appropriate legislation should not
be impracticably difficult, provided the New York law as to
the use of water for the benefit of non-riparian land were
revised to the extent hereinafter recommended."' A basic
rationale for a statute providing for the transfer of riparian
rights is afforded by the United Paper Board and Smith
cases. The scant attention which has been paid to these cases
by most texts and commentators may account at least in part
for the pessimistic assumption that the non-transferability
103. 3 FARNHAM, WATERS 2190 (1904); WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW (ch. by
Lauer) 431 (1958); Hanford v. St. Paul & D. R.R., 43 Minn. 104, 42 N.W.
596 (1890) holding that the privilege of access to navigable water is transferable, but suggesting that some other riparian rights might not be;
Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 8 S.E.2d 369 (1940) holding that the
privilege to use a stream for power is severable and transferable, but
quoting the passage from Farnham on Waters in which he suggested that
consumptive rights might not be: "Riparian law is not very well suited
to the transfer of water rights separate from the land." Trelease, Legal
Contributions to Water Resources Developaent, U. CONN. INST. OF WATER
But the statements which follow
RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2, at 9 (1967).
indicate that this comment was predicated on the assumption that harmful
non-riparian use cannot be legalized under the riparian system. A transfer
of any sort of riparian privilege or right for exercise for the benefit of
non-riparian land could, of course, be effective as against riparians other
than the grantor only to the extent that the granter himself could have
lawfully used the water on non-riparian land, for he cannot convey a
right or privilege which he himself lacked. Hutchins, Irrigation Water
Rights in California,CIRCULAR 452 REVISED, CALIF. AGRIC. ExPER. STATION
22 (1967). See also, as to the transfer of riparian rights and privileges,
BEUSCHER, WATER RIGHTS 186-88 (1967).
104. Tolley, Western Water Resources, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 259, 279 (1965);
Trelease & Lee, Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 5
(1966); King, Handling Riparian Rights in an Adjudication Act, PROCEEDINGS TEx. U. WATER LAW CONFERENCE 41 (1966).

105. As recommending legislation of this sort, see CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER
RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958).
106. See text accompanying notes 135 to 147 infra.
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of riparian rights is an incurable defect of the riparian
10
system. T
Free-loading by Riparians
Again, despite the enactment of section 429-j, and even
assuming that the harmful use bill becomes law, another
uncertainty will continue to exist in New York water law for
lack of authority unless it is resolved either by legislation
or by a court decision which might not be rendered for many
years. This uncertainty is as to whether a lower riparian
owner would be privileged to use part of the increase in
stream flow resulting from an impoundment erected by an
upper riparian owner despite the lower owner's unwillingness to contribute to the construction costs of the impoundment or to bear a share of its operating and maintenance
charges. In three other states this question has been answered
in the affirmative by the recognition of what might be called
a riparian free-loading privilege."' 8 The possibility that the
New York courts might follow these clearly inequitable decisions should be precluded by legislation for the encouragement and protection of private riparians contemplating
investment in impoundments. Several states have enacted
statutes designed to eliminate or at least to confine within
reasonable limits whatever common law free-loading privilege there may be."0 9 Appropriate legislation in this area
would, moreover, facilitate the planning and execution of
governmental water projects. Granted that the legislation
implementing the project might expressly provide that no
riparian owner below a dam could use more than his commonlaw share of the stream without making financial contribution, a lower riparian owner could argue that he was
exempt from this burden because his common law rights in
the stream attached not only to the natural part of the flow
107. The legal scholars who have recommended that riparian rights be made
transferable by statute apparently have not envisaged any insuperable
obstacles to such a step. See Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for
New Water Rights Laws, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797, 833 (1955); CRIBBET,
ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 50 (1958).

108. Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray 370, 375-76 (Mass. 1855); Druley v. Adam,
102 Ill. 177 (1882); Dyer v. Cranston Print Works, 22 R.I. 506, 48 A. 791
(1901); Lansdale v. City of Woonsocket, 25 R.I. 428, 56 A. 448 (1903);
Mason v. Whitney, 193 Mass. 152, 78 N.E. 881 (1906).
109. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1307 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1403 (1960);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.533(30) (1961); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 111.22 (1963).
See also 19 OKLA. L. REv. 462 (1966) discussing recent Oklahoma legislation.
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but also to the additional flow made available by the execution
of the governmental project.
One governmental official expressed his concern over the
problems with which the existence of a common law freeloading privilege might confront the operators of a government water project in the following language:
The problem of releases from impoundments for
water quality control is the most difficult problem
we have in the water quality field .

.

. Let us

assume... that we have secured adequate treatment
of wastes at their source .

.

. that the hydrological

problems are solved, that the mathematical problems
are solved, and that all other technical problems of
releasing water at the right time are solved.., that
the water has been impounded, and that it is now
being released from the reservoir. After the water
is released and flows down the stream, it presumably becomes a part of the waters of the State, just
like any other waters. Let us take an outrageous
case first. A farmer wants to irrigate downstream,
so he pumps water from the river, puts it on his
land, and the water does not get back into the
stream. Here, all the work, all the theory, all the
operating plans, all the Congressional objectives,
all the interstate and interagency agreements . . .
go right down the drain because the water is withdrawn. I think this is the prototype of the problem
that we have to deal with and that we can have
many, many variations of the same thing."'
While thorough study of the merits of the various possible answers to the questions as to what land is riparian,
as to what uses are domestic, as to the transferability of
riparian rights, and as to the existence of a free-loading
privilege should precede the enactment of legislation in regard to them, it would seem inadvisable to leave them unanswered much longer.111
REGULATION FOR

110.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SYMPOSIUM ON STREAM FLow
WATER QUALITY CONTROL 43-44 (paper by Stein) (1965).

111.

"The riparian doctrine, fluid in nature, may have been adequate to meet
changing needs in the past when water was plentiful relative to need, and
its use was mainly for non-consumptive purposes; but as the demands on
water resources grow, the necessity for legislation to define more explicitly
the relations between riparian owners will become more evident." Aycock,
North Carolina's Water Use Law, 46 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20 (1967). As to
another uncertainty in New York riparian law which might be added to
the list of those that it would be desirable to clarify by legislation, see the
text accompanying note 152 infra.
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Constitutionality of Necessary Legislation
Problems as to the constitutionality of whatever legislation is found to be desirable in these areas should be of less
than average difficulty. If there is no common law on a
particular point, there can be no common law rights in regard
to it to be impaired by the legislation supplying a rule. Section
14 of article 1 of the New York Constitution should not prove
to be an obstacle to gap-filling legislation because what it
purports to preserve is such parts of the common law...
as... did form the law" of the colony of New York in 1775,
and because such law apparently did not contain any rules
in regard to the questions listed in the preceding paragraph.
Scattering decisions rendered in other states in regard to
some of them need not be held to have created riparian rights
in New York waters, if the New York courts conclude that
such decisions were unsound in general, or inappropriate to
conditions existing in New York. Should a case arise involving a question to which the New York courts believed the
New York common law had given an answer resulting in the
creation of New York riparian rights and privileges, and if
the new legislation impaired them, such impairment could
probably be justified under the police power as in furtherance
of the public interest in readjusting the rights and privileges
of riparian owners as among themselves in a manner beneficial to the majority of such owners.11 2 It would seem,
therefore, that many of these questions could be dealt with
satisfactorily without any uncompensated impairment of
riparian rights whatever, and that any uncompensated impairment which might actually occur would not be more
substantial than property owners could fairly be asked to
accept, and probably would be willing to accept.
BENEFICIAL UNCERTAINTY:

FTErxmrn.T

The uncertainties in New York riparian law which have
been discussed herein up to this point are those which should
112. See text accompanying notes 80 and 88 supra. If the New York courts
should find that a free-loading privilege exists in New York at common
law, a constitutional basis for a statute destroying such privilege, which
might be considered more appropriate than that afforded by the police
power, might be found in the cases upholding statutes requiring persons
who had opposed the construction of certain works by conservancy, flood
control or drainage districts to pay part of the cost of such works because
otherwise they would be unjustly enriched by the benefits which they
derived from such works. See Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power,
107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1122 (1959).
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and can be eliminated without causing too substantial uncompensated impairment of existing riparian rights, and while
keeping within the framework of the riparian doctrine. Are
there others against which complaint has been made, but
which could not be eliminated without considerable departure
from the riparian system, and which should not be eliminated,
at least totally, in view of the desirable ends they serve I If
a New York riparian owner asks his attorney how much
water he could lawfully withdraw from a stream for irrigation, industrial use, or for some other worthy purpose, his
attorney will probably feel constrained to tell him that he
can use an amount which is reasonable under all the cir" ' Should the riparian owner inquire whether,
cumstances.11
after having invested in equipment or structures necessary
for his water-based activity, he might have to reduce the
amount of his withdrawals if the number of riparians using
the stream subsequently increases, his attorney will doubtless
give him an affirmative answer.11 ' If the riparian owner
should ask whether the amount he could lawfully take initially
might be reduced in the future, despite a substantial investment by him, should it appear that due to changes in economic
and social conditions, the public interest would be better
served if he took less water and the other riparians took
more, his attorney would probably again feel obliged to give
a discouraging reply."' Since these answers would be correct
under the riparian law prevailing in New York and many
other riparian doctrine states,"' the riparian system has been
attacked because of the uncertainty which adherence to it
involves. Thus it has recently been said:
[A] vested water right is a property right and therefore must be qualitatively defined. One can no more
have a vested right to divert a reasonable amount of
water than he can have a right to possess a reasonable
amount of land or withdraw a reasonable amount of
money from the bank. Numbers-acre feet-mathematical formulae must be substituted for adjectives
if this elusive right is to have substance. Otherwise
every riparian owner on the stream (whether he has
ever diverted before or not) is a potential destroyer
113.
114.
115.
116.

Timm v. Bear, 29 Wis. 254 (1871); Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N.Y. 341 (1878).
See authorities cited in note 52 supra.
See authorities cited in note 53 supra.
See authorities cited in notes 113, 52, and 53 supra.
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of the substance of the right of every other. Nothing
could be more self-defeating.'1 7

It is submitted nevertheless that the uncertainty which
is the consequence of adherence to the riparian doctrines of
reasonableness, survival of unused rights, and variability is
not an unmitigated evil which must be completely done away
with at all costs. Because the facts involved in any particular
water case more often than not fail substantially to duplicate
those appearing in any other, it would seem to be impossible
to formulate a set of rules by resort to which a riparian
owner could, without obtaining an adjudication, ascertain
the exact scope of his riparian rights and privileges in all
cases. The almost infinite number of conceivable situations
would call for an almost infinite number of rules. Experience
in the water field has shown that when the courts laid down
rules which purported to be definite, it became necessary to
recognize exceptions to them relatively soon after their promulgation, unless injustice was to be inflicted and the public
interest sacrificed for the sake of predictability.' 1 8 It is
doubtful that detailed legislation would fare much better.
The riparian right should, therefore, be determined by the
application of the reasonableness standard, at least initially.
And it would seem to be advisable to continue to apply
that standard at later stages. While it has been argued in
substance that it is unfair to require A, the first riparian
to use a stream, to cut down the extent of his use when
riparian B is ready to exercise his riparian privileges,"' it
is doubtful that such curtailment would disappoint any ex117. PROCEEDINGS TEX. U. WATER LAW CONFERENCE (paper by King) 39 (1966).
118. The difficulties attendant upon attempts to formulate definite rules as to
privileges and rights in regard to water are pointed out in City of Franklin
v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 51 A. 911, 58 L.R.A. 112 (1901) and Armstrong
v. Francis Corp., 20 NJ. 320, 120 A.2d 4, 59 A.L.R.2d (1956). Although
one of these cases involved surface water rather than stream or lake water,
and the other involved drainage of surface water into a stream, the points
made appear to be as valid for purely riparian law as for the law of surface
water. See also, as to the merits of a reasonableness standard, Wiel, Fifty
Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 252, 279-81 (1936). If the difficulty
of determining what is reasonable in water cases makes it seem inadvisable
to rely on the reasonableness standard as a basis of decision, the truth of
the following judicial utterance should be borne in mind. "There would seem
to be no more difficulty in ascertaining what is a reasonable use of water
than there is in determining probable cause, reasonable doubt, reasonable
diligence, preponderance of evidence, a rate that is just and reasonable,
public convenience and necessity, and numerous other problems which in
their nature are not subject to precise definition but which tribunals exercising judicial functions must determine." Chow v. City of Santa Barbara,
217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
119. Trelease, Policies for Water, 5 NATUAL RESOURCES J. 1, 32 (1965).
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pectation of A's which could be characterized as reasonable;
for however uncertain New York riparian law presently may
be in certain respects, most New York riparians know that
the rule that riparian rights are not lost by non-use prevails
in their state. It could be suggested, moreover, that A, instead
of complaining when compelled to relinquish B's share, should
count himself fortunate because he had been allowed to use
it without liability during the period of B's non-use. 2 '
It has also been asserted in substance that the uncertainty
as to the extent and duration of a riparian right attributable
to the riparian doctrines of reasonableness, survival of unused
rights, and variability discourages the private development of
water resources because private riparians are reluctant to
invest in a project based on water rights when they have no
assurance as to their extent and duration.'21 Although the
degree to which this assertion is true is not accurately
known, 22 the amount of truth in it is probably too great to
be cavalierly overlooked. Thus in 1967 both farmers and
industrialists were still complaining to New York water
officials about the risks inherent in investing in water-based
activities under New York's present riparian system. 12 On
the other hand, it is doubtful that the private development of
water resources is currently being so much deterred by the
existing uncertainty as to the extent and duration of riparian
rights as to require the complete abandonment of the reasonableness, survival of unused rights, and variability doctrines by retention of which flexibility in the water use
pattern in response to changed conditions may be facilitated.
The fact that the variability principle has thus far seldom
been actually applied in furtherance of this end 2 does not
preclude the possibility that there will be future use for it
120. A would be free from liability under § 429-j of the N.Y. Conservation Law,
and under the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine, if it were
true that because of B's failure to make use of the water, he would be
unable to show that A's use was causing him harm. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
ch. 41, at 346 (1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 163-64 (Casner ed.
1952); 5 POWELL REAL PROPERTY § 712 (1962); 50 IowA L. REV. 141, 143
n.14 (1964)).
121. Trelease, Policies for Water, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 23 (1965).
122. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
123. In this connection it should be noted that the N.Y. Commission on the
Preservation of Agricultural Land at 27 of its report to the Governor
dated Jan. 1, 1968, recommended that the Water Resources Commission
provide irrigation permits that would be attached to land so long as it
remains in agricultural use.
124. Trelease & Lee, Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 4
(1965).
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when mounting demands for water generate pressure for
changes in the water use pattern. That belief in the desirability of these doctrines as a preserver of flexibility still
exists to a significant extent in the eastern states is indicated
by the number of provisions in eastern permit statutes which
either place time limits on the duration of permits or even
go so far as to make permits revocable at any time." 5 As
the enactment of these statutes was no doubt preceded
by careful consideration of pros and cons, their passage
affords appreciable justification for the view that it would
be inadvisable for New York to abandon the reasonableness
and variability principles completely. "6
And the doctrine that riparian rights survive non-use
cannot be abandoned without injustice" to the many New
125. As in Iowa a water use permit may not endure for more than ten years
without renewal [IOWA CODE § 455A.20 (1966)], and may be cancelled to
protect the public interest or to prevent injury to person or property, the
status of the permittee is "little more than a mere tenant at will of the
use." Hines, A Decade of Experience under the Iowa Water Permit System,
7 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 499, 547 (1967). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.44(g)
(1963) still provides that permits are subject to cancellation at any time if
necessary to protect the public interest despite the statement of the Minn.
Water Resources Brd. in its 1963 report on water law study at 48-49 that
Minnesota water use permits are insecure. The second sentence of the
ambiguous provision in Miss. CODE ANN. § 5956-05 (1966 Cum.Supp.) that
"No water appropriation acquired pursuant to law shall be declared forfeited and surrendered except by a court of competent jurisdiction as other
property rights are determined. Provided, however, upon good cause shown,
the board may modify or terminate any appropriation at any time," points
toward uncertainty in the duration of permits; the degree of uncertainty
depending upon the construction which the courts put upon the phrase, "upon
good cause shown." See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306 (1947); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3.533(22) and 13.145(1) (1967) ; 58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1-44 (1937);
TEX. WATER COMM. rule 205.4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.18 (1964).
126. As favoring limitation of the duration of water rights, stressing the importance of flexibility, and supporting the variability principle, see Maquis,
Freeman & Heath, Movement for New Water Rights Laws, 23 TENN. L. REV.
797, 832, 835 (1955) ; HABER & BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN
U.S. (ch. by Haar & Gordon) 38 (1958); CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS,
48

(1958);

ALLEE, GOVERNMENTAL

FACILITATION OF IRRIGATION IN NEW

YORK 375 (doctoral thesis) (1961); Maloney, Eastern Laws Concerning
Minimum Stream Flows, paper delivered at SOUTHEASTERN WATER LAW
CONFERENCE 301 (1961); O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute, 47 IOWA
L. REV. 549, 578 (1962); Lugar, Water Rights Law and Management in
West Virginia, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SERIES No. 4, W. VA. CENTER FOR APPALACHIAN STUDIES 37-38 (1967). For discussion of appropriate durations for
permits for various water uses, see Trelease, Policies for Water Law, 5
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 23-6 (1965).
127. "In the interest both of equity and of avoiding constitutional difficulties it
may be desirable to protect the presently unused rights of riparian owners."
Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Law Rights,
23 TENN. L. REV. 797, 835 (1955). "And it is admitted that these rights
may have real value, as representing claims to a future water supply; they
may even represent actual investment, if riparian land has been purchased
at a price which includes the potential value of the undeveloped rights. To
destroy such values would run counter to one of the major principles outlined above-security of investment in water rights." Trelease, A Model
Water Code, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 819 (1957). See also CRIBBET,
ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW, 46 (1958).
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Yorkers who have invested in riparian land in reliance upon
the prevalence of this doctrine in New York, and without
warning of the possibility that if they did not make prompt
use of their riparian rights and privileges, any person could,
without obligation to make compensation, destroy the value
of those rights and privileges by beginning a use of the
stream or lake before they were ready to do so. The infliction of such injustice would seem to be too high a price
to pay for the elimination of an uncertainty to stimulate
private development of the state's water resources, particularly in view of the fact that under section 429-j of the
Conservation Law enacted in 1966, it is now clear that
abolition of unused riparian rights is not prerequisite to
the prevention of water waste in New York, because under
that section any person, whether riparian owner or not, may
use all of the water in a stream or lake so long as such use
does not cause present harm to other riparians. Granted that
such complete use would have to be reduced when and if
previously inactive riparians were ready to use the water,
there would be no period of time during which water would
have to flow down to the sea unused because of the existence
of unexercised riparian rights."'
Reconciliation of Need for Certainty and Flexibility
It appearing then that the doctrine of survival of unused
riparian rights has been made considerably less objectionable
by the enactment of section 429-j, and recognizing that it is
impossible to devise a system of water law which would
provide both complete certainty and complete flexibility,"'
what could be done in New York within the framework of
the riparian system to achieve a proper balance between these
conflicting desiderata? It is submitted that reasonable
degrees of both certainty and flexibility could be provided
by a statute which provided that a court, when adjudicating
a water right, could specify in its decree the duration of that
right. Or legislation might be adopted providing for the
establishment of a permit system to be run by an administrative agency with power to issue permits to applicants
128. See text accompanying note 27 supra. For further discussion of the injustice involved in the uncompensated abolition of unused riparian rights, see
text accompanying notes 168 to 178 infra.
129. Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws,
23 TENN. L. REv. 797, 832 (1955).
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whose proposed activities the agency could find would be
reasonable and lawful when evaluated in the light of the
factors by consideration of which the reasonableness of waterconnected activity has customarily been determined by courts
adhering to the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine.' 0 Either type of statute could specify a number of
years beyond which the right or permit could not endure
While
unless renewed after hearing the interested parties.'
determination of water rights by administrative bodies and
the establishment and operation of permit systems are practices more prevalent in prior appropriation system states
than in riparian system jurisdictions, their introduction in
the latter has not required them to abandon the riparian
doctrine."' 2
Constitutionality of Necessary Legislation
Inasmuch as legislation authorizing a court or administrative body, when adjudicating the water interest of riparian
owner A, to specify a duration for any particular privilege
recognized as existing in him might lead to a delay in the
As apparently indicating approval of resort to devices of substantially this
sort to resolve the conflict between the need for certainty and the need for
flexibility, see Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water
Rights Laws, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797, 832 (1955); CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER
RIGHTS LAw, 48 (1958); Maloney, Eastern Laws Concerning Minimum
Stream Flows, PAPERS SOUTHEASTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE, 301 (1961);
O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating
Existing Uses of Water, 47 IOWA L. REV. 549, 580 (1962).
131. Such legislation could instruct the court or agency, when fixing within the
statutory limit the duration of a water right established by a decree or
permit, to take into account all relevant circumstances, including the period
of time in which the owner of the right could be reasonably expected to
amortize his investment [comment to § 406 of the Model Water Use Act;
Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws, 23
TENN. L. REv. 797, 835 (1955); Trelease, Policies for Water, 5 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 1, 25 (1965) ] ; how soon the water right in question would be
likely to become more harmful [Hauver, Water for Recreation, 44 DENVER
L.J. 288, 298 (1967)]; the relative economic and social importance of the
right; and the probable duration of such importance.
132. That the riparian doctrine can be administratively rather than judicially
applied and enforced, see HABER & BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN THE
EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Haar & Gordon) 36 (1958). Obviously assuming the
truth of this statement are suggestions that a riparian doctrine state could
have an administrative reasonable use law. See HABER & BERGEN, WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Fisher) 484 (1958) and CRIBBET,
ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 48 (1958). Indeed, it has been said that the
Iowa permit system "may be viewed as very similar to that which prevailed
at common law in Iowa under the doctrine of reasonable use. Under the
statute the determination as to reasonableness is made by the Water Commissioner and the Council but subject to judicial review." O'Connell, Iowa's
New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses
of Water, 47 IowA L. REV. 549, 634 (1962). In a similar vein it has been
said that "Aside from the changes relating to irrigation, Iowa water users
have approximately the same rights under the statute as they did under
common law." Hines, A Decade of Experience under the Iowa Water Permit
System, MONO. No. 9, IOWA UNrv. AGRiC. LAW CENTER 97 (1966).
130.
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beginning of the exercise by riparian B of one of his unused
riparian privileges beyond the time when he became ready
to use it, or might delay a decrease pursuant to the doctrine
of variability in the extent of the privilege awarded to A
and an increase in the privilege which B was exercising, it
could be agrued that if the delay in the change was longer
than it would have been at common law, the legislation was
unconstitutional because involving an impairment of B's
common law riparian interest with no provision for compensation to him.
One answer to this argument might be that in actions
either for damages or for an injunction, the extent and
conditions of B's privileges would have to be determined at
common law by what would be reasonable under all the circumstances; and that a court, or a jury under court instruction, might well find that A's use remained reasonable until
he had a reasonable time to curtail it, and that B's use would
not become reasonable until the expiration of that time. The
legislation in question might therefore be viewed as basically
a codification of the common law, made for the purpose of
reminding the courts if the jurisdiction were left with them,
of a factor which should be taken into account when passing
on the reasonableness issue. If the legislation transferred
the jurisdiction over water cases at the trial level to an
administrative body,' it could be said that the purpose of
the codification was to give that body the power to fix the
duration of a riparian privilege which the courts had at
common law.
Another answer which might be made to the charge that
the legislation under consideration would be unconstitutional
because involving uncompensated impairment of a riparian
interest would be a repetition of the argument which has been
made several times previously herein in support of other
proposed legislation which might alter New York riparian
rights:... viz., that this legislation would constitute a valid
exercise of the police power, because in furtherance of the
public interest in making appropriate adjustments in the
133. As to the constitutionality of state legislation purporting to confer judicial
power upon an administrative agency, see 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.10 (1958). Discussion of this question is beyond the scope of
this article.
134. See text accompanying notes 32 to 40, 84 to 88, and 112 supra.
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rights and privileges of riparian owners as among themselves.

It is submitted, moreover, that such uncompensated impairment of riparian rights as the legislation under consideration
might cause would clearly seem to be too small to be characterized as substantial.
RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON NoN-RIPARIAN USE

In one area of New York water law-that of non-riparian
use-there exists a need for legislation which cannot be
satisfied by a statute that merely clarifies existing uncertainties, but can be met only by one that would effect a
change in New York common law now in force. A common
criticism of the riparian system is that in most of the states
in which it prevails, it restricts the use of stream or lake
water for the benefit of non-riparian land to too great an
extent.13 5 In some jurisdictions such use is prohibited, even
though harmless. Under what is probably the plurality view
such use is prohibited if it causes harm, even though the
harm would have been held reasonable and lawful if inflicted
in the course of a use for the benefit of riparian land. 3 ' This
appears to be the present New York position.'3 7 In only a
few states is a harmful non-riparian use permitted at common
Justification
law, if reasonable under all the circumstances.'
of the criticism of this discrimination against non-riparian
uses is afforded by the fact that under some circumstances,
non-riparian uses would better serve the public interest than
riparian uses ;1" and by the further fact that some riparian
135. Marquis, Freeman & Heath, Movement for New Water Rights Laws, 23
TENN. L. REV. 797, 832 (1955); CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW 28
(1958); "Perhaps no feature of riparian law has received more adverse
and critical comment than the concept that the waters are reserved for
the benefit of the lands along the stream, and that rights to the use of
water are special privileges of the owners of such lands." Trelease, Legal
Contributions to Water Resource Development, U. CONN. INST. OF WATER
RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2, at 9 (1967).
136. That in the western states which still recognize riparian rights, a riparian
owner can complain only of non-riparian appropriations that cause him an
actual loss or injury, see Trelease, Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use,
12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 2 (1957).
137. Garwood v. New York Cent. & H.R. R.R., 83 N.Y. 400 (1881); Knauth v.
Erie R.R., 219 A.D. 83, 219 N.Y.S. 266 (1926). Doubt as to the legality in
New York of harmless non-riparian uses was dispelled in 1966 by the
enactment of N.Y. CONSERv. LAW § 429-j (1966) which declared them lawful.
138. For collections of authorities supporting the several views see 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 123 (3d ed. 1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 162,
164 (Casner ed. 1954); 34 N.C. L. REv. 247 (1956).
139. "The court appears to consider that the natural allocation of water between
various watersheds ought not to be disturbed by the abstraction of water
from one and its diversion to another. If this is the theory of the limitationto-the-watershed rule, the rule is not properly applicable to all types of
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owners, who are not in a position to engage in a waterconnected activity, would be better off if they could sell
their riparian privileges to non-riparians for use in connection with non-riparian land.
The undesirably restrictive effect of the New York rule
prohibiting harmful non-riparian use, even though except
for its non-riparian character, it would be reasonable under
all circumstances, could be considerably minimized by accompanying the already suggested clarification of the New York
law as to which riparian rights and privilege can survive
severance from the riparian land to which they are incident,1" 0
with a revision of the New York law which would permit
uses in connection with non-riparian land if reasonable,1 '
even though they cause harm, provided the person making the
non-riparian use has lawful access to the stream or lake;
provided the quantity of water used by the non-riparian party
is no greater than could have lawfully been used by the
riparian whose transferee he is; and provided the harm caused
by such use is no greater than could have lawfully been caused
by the transferor of the riparian privilege if he had elected
to exercise it instead of transferring it.""
As a modest precursor to such legislation, the harmful
use bill now before the New York legislature contains a
provision which would permit a riparian owner to use his
share of the water on such non-riparian land as he might
own, if he found it to his advantage to do so; this privilege
of shifting his place of use to be subject to the conditions
specified in the preceding paragraph as to quantity withwater uses. Uses of reasonable quantities of water for consumption would
appear to be proper, whether made within the watershed or outside it.
Permitting use outside the watershed may encourage uses which would not
otherwise occur, but this result does not seem blameworthy if the use is
reasonable." Haar & Gordon, Riparian Water Rights, 38 B.U.L. REV. 207,
240 (1958). "The obtaining of the maximum benefits of the use of water
is a goal that is obviously not always reached by using it nearest its
source." Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Development,
U. CONN. INST. OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2 at 9 (1967).
140. See text accompanying notes 98 to 105 supra.
141. The New York rule forbidding harmful use on non-riparian land constitutes
a formidable practical obstacle to the transfer of riparian rights to nonriparians. If a riparian owner has only the privilege of making a harmless
use on non-riparian land, he obviously cannot transfer to a grantee a
privilege to make a harmful use even though reasonable.
142. MODEL WATER USE ACT § 407 provides for non-riparian use. Relaxation of
the rule against such use has occurred in several states. As to Florida, see
Maloney, Eastern Laws Concerning Minimum Stream Flows, paper delivered at SOUTHWESTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE 303 (1961); as to Wisconsin, see Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 448, 9 (1961).
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drawable and resulting harm.14 But would this provision
and the more extensive revision in the New York law as to
the legality of harmful non-riparian uses recommended above,
be compatible with the view previously expressed herein that
New York should solve its water problems within the framework of the riparian doctrine ?" Would New York still be
a riparian doctrine state if, under the conditions specified,
it should permit harmful uses for the benefit of non-riparian
land, provided they were reasonable under all the circumstances 1. It is submitted that these questions can be answered
in the affirmative.
Since under such legislation a non-riparian use could
be made only by a person having lawful access to the water;
since such lawful access could be obtained only from or
through a riparian owner by grant, prescription or eminent
domain; and since the privilege of use exercised by the nonriparian party could be obtained by him only from the same
source and in the same manner, the revision of New York
law under consideration would not conflict with the basic
premise of the riparian doctrine: viz., that the source of all
private water rights is the ownership of riparian land. The
privileges exercised by a person making a non-riparian use
under the proposed legislation would be riparian privileges
not only because they, and the prerequisite privilege of access
to the water, must have been derived from a riparian owner,
but also because the extent of such privileges in the hands
of a non-riparian would be measured by their extent in the
hands of their original riparian owner. Futhermore, the fact
that under the plurality rule in riparian doctrine states, use
for the benefit of non-riparian land is permitted, provided
it harms no riparian owner," shows that it has for a considerable time been widely recognized that the riparian doctrine does not make ownership of riparian land a condition
to possession of the privilege of using stream or lake water.
Concerning the constitutionality of the provision in
regard to harmful non-riparian use included in the harmful
Even this small step might be viewed as effecting a change in the common
law. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903) stating
that a riparian owner cannot divert to non-riparian land water which he has
a right to use on riparian land. Precedent for the provision to the contrary
in the harmful use bill is afforded by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(5) (1964).
144. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 135 to 138 supra.
143.
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use bill and of legislation implementing the broader proposal
in this area outlined above, there should be little doubt. It
is true that a riparian owner attacking either could argue that
it purported to permit use on non-riparian land which was
harmful to him, and thus curtailed his commonlaw riparian
right that no use of the water can be made on non-riparian
land if it causes him harm. 4 6 But the violation of this right
which either the harmful use bill or the broader legislation
would permit is technical rather than substantial, because
each would allow a harmful use on non-riparian land only
if such use would be no more harmful to the complaining
riparian than it would have been if it had been lawfully made
in connection with riparian land; and because neither purports to legalize any other harmful non-riparian uses. A
harmful use on non-riparian land would seem to be the
substantial equivalent of a harmless use on non-riparian land,
when the harmful non-riparian uses involves no more harm
to the objecting riparian than he would have sustained from
the riparian use to which he could not object because of its
reasonableness. As the legislation under consideration would
not increase the already existing risk of harm to other
riparians from reasonable uses, the considerations which
demonstrate the constitutionality of section 429-j enacted in
1966 and legalizing all harmless uses14 7 would appear to establish the constitutional validity of the provision of the harmful
use bill in regard to non-riparian use and of the broader
proposal as well.
DESIRABLE STREAM

FLOW REmULATION

When considering whether or not satisfactory solutions
to New York's water problems can be achieved within the
framework of the riparian system, it should be borne in mind
that there is no incompatibility between that system and
police power legislation so necessary under present conditions
to protect the streams and lakes of the state against pollution
and other destructive abuse. Thus there is already in force
in New York legislation to control pollution'4 8 and to prevent
undesirable alterations in the physical condition of streams.1 49
146.
147.
148.
149.

See text accompanying note 137 supra.
See text accompanying notes 32 to 40 supra.
N.Y. PuBLIc HEALTH LAw arts. 11 & 12.
N.Y. CONsERV. LAW § 429-a to 429-g.
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Expansion of the scope of the stream protection law in the
interests of navigation, water quality control, fish and wildlife, recreation and scenic beauty by adding a provision that
no one should reduce the level of a stream or lake below a
specified minimum without having obtained a permit from
a designated administrative agency would appear to be desirable and would be no more inconsistent with the riparian
system than the present statute. 5 '
The distinction between such legislation and that which
provides for the issue of permits to appropriate water in
excess of the average minimum flow of a stream or of the
average minimum level of a lake, should be kept in mind.
The former, which would restrict the riparian privileges of
all riparian owners in order to protect various aspects of
the public interest in the water resources of the state would
clearly appear to be constitutional."' On the other hand, if
at New York common law a riparian owner's privilege of
use extends to flood water or to water in excess of the
average minimum flow of a stream or of a normal lake level,
and if a riparian owner has a right that this privilege shall
not be unreasonably interfered with,' the constitutionality
150. For statutes of this type in other states see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306 (c)
(1947); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 33(22), 11.300(1) and 11.431 (1960). MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 110.13 (1963), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1-40 (1935) and statutes
collected in Heath, Water Management Legislation in the Eastern States,
2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 99, 105, 112 (1967). Under a bill now before the
N.Y. legislature (N.Y. Senate No. 878; Assembly No. 1570) the establishment of lake improvement districts with the power to control the level of
lakes within their boundaries would be authorized. An apparently similar
proposal has recently been adopted in Florida. 2 WATER CONTROL NEws,
No. 11, at 8, July 31, 1967.
151. As tending to establish the constitutionality of such a regulatory stream
flow or lake level statute enacted in the interests of navigation, see People
v. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 343 et seq., 141 N.E.2d 429, 160
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1953); enacted to maintain water quality, see Utica v. Water
Pollution Control Board, 5 N.Y.2d 164, 156 N.E.2d 301 (1959) ; enacted to
protect wildlife, see Barrett v. State of New York, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E.
99, LRA 1918C 400 (1917); enacted to further recreation, see People v.
System Properties, Inc., supra; enacted to protect aesthetic values, see People
v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed
for want of substantial federal question, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); Matter of
Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22,
motion for reargument denied, 19 N.Y.2d 862 (1967); Barrett v. State of
New York, supra and People v. System Properties, Inc., supra.
152. While there appears to be no New York case establishing the privilege and
right referred to, it seems likely that the New York courts would recognize
them as existing in any stream or lake water which had not become surface
water by separation from the stream or lake by natural forces. One basis
for this assumption is afforded by cases decided in other states which the
New York courts might follow. See Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrig.
Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502, 22 L.N.S. 391 (1907); Longmire v. Yakima
Highlands Co., 95 Wash. 302, 163 P. 782 (1910); Tilden v. Smith, 94 Fla.
502, 113 So. 708 (1927). The contrary case of Motl v. Boyd, 117 Tex. 82,
286 S.W. 458 (1926) might possibly be treated as distinguishable as refer-
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of the latter sort of statute would be more doubtful because
providing in substance for the destruction of this riparian
privilege and right without compensation. But even if such
a statute could be upheld as a valid police power measure,
as is entirely conceivable,"' it is submitted that New York
should not adopt that sort of legislation unless it provided
in effect that in determining what water was surplus, the
riparian privilege and right with respect to flood water or
water above the average minimum level must be taken into
account."' The enactment of such a statute lacking such a
provision would be undesirable, not only because inconsistent
with the riparian system, but also because it would be unjust
to riparian owners who have not as yet begun to exercise their
privilege with respect to flood or surplus water. 5
PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
Having attempted to show that New York water law

can be substantially improved by measures no more radical
than clarification and revision of its riparian doctrine, consideration will now be given to the desirability of the superable in part to legislation. The assumption might also find support in the
analogy afforded by the New York rule that a riparian who causes harm
by interfering with the flow of high water while it is still a part of a
natural watercourse is liable therefor. Howard v. City of Buffalo, 211
N.Y. 241, 105 N.E. 426 (1914). Edward L. Ryan, thoroughly conversant
with New York water law for many years, said, when legal consultant
to the New York Temporary State Commission on Water Resources Planning: "Riparian rights apply to the natural flow of a stream or lake including high and low water stages." Hearings, Before New York Temporary
State Comm'n on Water Resources Planning, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15, at 141
(1964). For more extended discussion see CORNELL UNIVERSITY WATER
REsoURcS CENTER, PROFILE OF A WATERSHED: FLINT CREEK 128 (1965).
The uncertainty in New York riparian law caused by lack of New York
authority as to whether riparian privileges and rights attach to flood
water or to water above average minimum levels could well be added
to the list of uncertainties previously set forth herein which should be
clarified by legislation. See text accompanying notes 48 to 110 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 80 to 88 supra.
154. For legislation containing such a provision see MICH. STAT. ANN., §§ 3.533
(22) (1960) et. seq. which permit impoundment and use of surplus water, but
protect the privileges and rights of all riparians to share in the entire
stream flow by defining surplus water as that which may be impounded
without decreasing stream flow below its optimum flow, and by providing
that optimum flow shall be determined by taking account of the range of
stream flow variation, the stream's waste assimilation capacity, its practical
utility for domestic use, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, municipal and
industrial water supply, commercial and recreational, navigation, public
and private utilities; and by taking account of the present riparian uses
of the stream, of those which may be made in the foreseeable future, and
of such other factors as are necessary to preserve the rights of riparians.
This legislation, which became effective in 1964, appears to be a logical
development of the Ideas regarding the use of water in excess of minimum
flows and levels expressed in Maloney, Eastern Laws Concerning Minimum
Stream Flovs, paper delivered at SOUTHEASTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE
295, 297 (1961).
155. As to such injustice see the text immediately following that to note 126 supra.
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imposition of some version of the prior appropriation system

on existing New York riparian law. General descriptions of
the prior appropriation system present it in a very favorable
light. Its advocates say in substance that it encourages the
maximum development of water resources by private enterprise by assuring to a prospective investor in a waterconnected project a right to a definite quantity of water in
perpetuity, and that it facilitates the future alterations in
the pattern of water use which should occur in response to
changes in the relative economic and social importance of
the various demands for water by permitting the appropriator
to sell and transfer his right whenever it becomes more
valuable to someone else than it is to him.'6
UNCERTAINTIES

ExisnNG UNDER

THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM

It would seem, however, that the statement that the prior
appropriation system assures the prospective appropriator of
a definite quantity of water in perpetuity should be qualified.'57 Even an appropriator with the highest priority will
get less water than his appropriation calls for if a drought
occurs which is so severe as to reduce the stream flow below
that necessary to satisfy his appropriative right."' Since
junior appropriators can take no water except what remains
after the senior appropriator has withdrawn the amount he
156. See, e.g., Trelease & Lee, Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv.
1,4 (1966).
157. "It is argued that . . . the appropriation system removes the insecurity
involved in the riparian system and tends to protect and encourage investments in the development and use of water resources. But evidence indicates
that this illusion of certainty is not borne out in the operation of the
appropriation system in the West and that often the individual water user
is no more certain of his water rights than a similar user under the
riparian system." Maloney, Florida'sNew Water Resources Law, 10 U. FLA.
L. REv. 119, 126-7 (1957) quoting in support of this conclusion the following statement made by Thomas Maddoch, Jr., Chief, Irrigation Operation
Branch, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in 1956: "The appropriation doctrine
is presumed to set up water rights with finality and mathematical precision,
but any man in the West where water use is fully developed has no idea
as to his water rights." From informal oral statements made by insurance
company officers, the author has gained the impression that in the West,
title insurance is obtainable on water rights only for a premium higher than
that charged for insurance on other interests in land, and that the title
companies make little effort to sell title policies covering water rights.
Assuming their accuracy, such statements point toward the conclusion that
the prior appropriation system, even in its native habitat, is not credited with
the ability always to assure to an appropriator a right to a definite quantity
of water in perpetuity.
158. "The amount that each appropriator is entitled to receive remains fixed,
if there is sufficient flow in the stream to supply it . . . . "(emphasis
added) Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Development,
U. CONN. INST. OF WATER RESOURCEs, REPORT No. 2, at 6 (1967).
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is entitled to... and since moderate droughts, which occur
not infrequently, may render the stream flow inadequate to
supply all appropriators, junior appropriators may quite
often find that they are unable to get all the water called
for by their appropriations."' It follows then that the statement of quantity in the description of an appropriative right
merely marks the upper limit of the right, and guarantees to
its holder a definite quantity of water only if it is available.
Again, since holders of a contract right to water supplied by a ditch company from a single appropriation pro-rate
in time of shortage,1"' the actual extent of their water rights
is indefinite except as to the maximum withdrawal permissible. Moreover, the quantity of water which an appropriator
may be able to get may depend in part as a practical matter
on whether or not he will be allowed to persist in an inexpensive but wasteful means of diversion. If he is not allowed to
continue it, the amount of water which he can afford to
withdraw may be much less than it would be if adherence to
his original diversion means were permitted.'6 2 The rule that
an appropriative right is measured by the actual need of
also can make it difficult to fix the
the appropriator 0
quantitative extent of the appropriative right exactly. As
in dry years an irrigator will need more water from the
stream than in wet years, it would seem to follow that the
quantity which he would be entitled to take would vary from
year to year.
159. Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Development, U. CONN.
INST. OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT NO. 2, at 6 (1967); Hutchins, Irrigation
Water Rights in California, CIRCULAR 452 REvIsED, CALIF. AGRIC. ExPERIMENT STATION 27, 33 (1967).

160. "[T]he certainty claimed for uses under appropriation rights may be somewhat exaggerated. The certainty attaching to an appropriation rights,
particularly one of junior priority, can be no greater than the dependability
of the water supply."

HABER & BERGEN, WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN

UNITED STATES (ch. by Fisher) 86 (1958).
161.

SAx, WATER LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 280 (1965).

162. This would apparently be true even under the new Alaska Water Use Act
of 1966, which has been described as "regulated prior appropritaion in its
most modern form, with much old baggage removed and many undesirable
features eliminated." Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 1, 14, 34-35 (1967).
163. Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Devefopment, U. CONN.
INST. OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2, at 6 (1967) ; Hutchins, IRRIGATION
WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA, CIRCULAR 452 REVISED, CALIF. AGRic. EXPER.
STATION 28 (1967).
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Since appropriative water rights can be lost by abandonthey obviously are not
ment or forfeiture for non-use,'
perpetual in any absolute sense; and the abandonment and
forfeiture issues are often hotly disputed. It follows that in
certain instances an appropriator will not know whether he
has lost part or all of his right, and so will be ignorant of
its exact extent, until the abandonment or forfeiture issue
has been adjudicated.
The relation of the factors referred to above to the
transferability of an appropriative water right is obvious.
Since they create uncertainty as to its quantitative extent
and as to its very existence, and since such uncertainty will
discourage some prospective buyers, they will decrease its
marketability. An industrial concern considering the purchase of an irrigator's appropriative right in order to secure
a water supply would have to reckon with the possibility that
its quantum would vary from year to year, since the amount
to which the irrigator would be entitled was measured by his
need, which would very from year to year. Under such conditions, the general rule that an appropriative right is transferable loses an appreciable amount of its practical significance."6 5 Moreover, since transfer of appropriative water
rights is permitted only if it can be effected without prejudice
to the other holders of water rights on the stream,' a prospective buyer of an appropriative right may be faced with a
difficult question of fact the answer to which can be obtained
only at considerable expense.
The foregoing is not, of course, intended to suggest that
the uncertainties as to the extent of appropriative water
rights are so great as to lead to the conclusion that the prior
appropriation system should be abandoned in the West as well
as rejected in the East. The economic and social gains
164. Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Development, U. CONN.
INST. OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2, at 7 (1967); Hutchins, Irrigation
Water Rights in California, CIRcuLAR 452 REVIsED, CALiF. AGRIC. EXPER.
STATION 34 (1967).
165. For comments on difficulties involved in attempts to transfer appropriative
water rights, see Seastone & Hartman, Alternative Institutions for Water
Transfers, 39 LAND ECON. 31 (1963); Trelease, Policies for Water, 5
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 ,33 (1965); Yeutter, Legal-Economic Critique of
Nebraska Water Course Law, 44 NEB. L. REv. 11, 41 (1965); Comment, 42
DENVER L. J. 116 (1965).
166. WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW (ch. by McCormick) 34 (1958); 5 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY 456 (1962). And this would seem to be true under the new
Alaska Water Use Act. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 1, 38 (1967).
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achieved under it have been too great to permit the adoption
of a position so extreme. Attention has been called to these
uncertainties merely to show that the prior appropriation
system, like the riparian system, has disadvantages as well as
advantages, and that some of the disadvantages of the prior
appropriation system appear in an area in which superiority
over the riparian system is claimed for it. It must be conceded, however, that the New York riparian law, even if
clarified and revised to the extent suggested herein, would,
if the reasonableness, survival of unused rights, and variability doctrines were retained as recommended," 7 involve on
the whole more uncertainty than is incident to the prior
appropriation system. The question, therefore, is whether in
view of this, of other advantages and disadvantages respectively incident to the two systems, and of the conditions
presently existing in New York, it should superimpose the
prior appropriation system on its present riparian system
or even borrow extensively from the appropriation system.
PROTECTION OF UNUSED RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Relevant to the first branch of this general question is
the specific question as to whether superimposition of the
prior appropriation system on New York's present riparian
system would necessarily involve the abolition of unused
riparian rights. This would depend on which version of the
prior appropriation system was superimposed. In some of
the states in which both appropriative and riparian rights
have been recognized from an early date, unused riparian
rights are protected. 6 8 However, the tendency in states which
have recently superimposed the prior appropriation system
on a riparian system seems to have been to shape the superimposing legislation so as to limit the protection of riparian
9
rights to those in use at the effective date of the statute."
This is a logical position to take if encouragement of the
development of unused water resources is deemed to be of
overriding importance.
167. See text accompanying notes 113 to 132 supra.

168. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights, 33 TEXAS
L. REv. 24, 67 (1954).
169. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5956-01 to -30 (1966 Cum. Supp.). See
also MODEL WATER USE ACT § 308.
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It is submitted, however, that the interests of the owners
of unused riparian rights deserve protection. The injustice
which would be inflicted on them by the uncompensated
destruction of such rights in the form of disappointment of
legitimate expectations and of financial loss has already been
adverted to. It has also been previously pointed out that the
infliction of such injustice would be too high a price to
pay for stimulation of private investment in water-connected
activity in view of the fact that the enactment of section 429-j
of the New York Conservation Law has made it unnecessary
to abolish unused riparian rights in order to prevent the
waste of water in New York."'
Constitutionality of the Abolition of Unused Riparian Rights
It should be noted, however, that while statutes purporting to abolish unused riparian rights without compensation
have been stricken down by some courts as unconstitutional,
other courts have upheld such statutes;171 and undoubtedly
would not have done so had they believed that they would
subject the owners of unused riparian rights to serious injustice.1 7 And it must be conceded, moreover, that the decisions
upholding the constitutionality of zoning legislation furnish
analogical support for the validity not only of the legislation
previously recommended herein to effect appropriate adjustments in the rights and privileges of riparian owners as among
themselves,1 7 but also for the validity of a statute purporting
to abolish unused riparian rights without compensation.'74 If
a landowner can constitutionally be deprived without compensation of his privilege to devote his land to industrial use, if
he has not exercised that privilege before the enactment of
the restrictive ordinance, it would seem that an owner of
riparian land could constitutionally be deprived without
170. See text accompanying notes 127 and 128 supra.
171. For discussion of the constitutionality of such statutes and for citations to
the divided authorities, see Trelease, COORDINATION OF RIPARIAN AND APPRoPRIATIVE RIGHTS, 33 TEXAS L. RaY. 24, 62-7 (1954); Marquis, Freeman &
Heath, The Movement for New Water Law Rights, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797,
828 (1955); CRIBBEr, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAW, 41, 6 (1958).
172. As to the consideration given by the courts to possible disappointment of
reasonable expectations and possible unfairness when deciding whether a
statute constitutes a valid exercise of the police power, see text accompanying note 26 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 85 & 86 supra.
174. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights, 33 TEXAS
L. REV. 24, 67 (1954); Trelease, Policies for Water Law, 5 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 1, 37 (1965).
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compensation of his privilege to use the body of water to
which his land is riparian, if he had not exercised that privilege prior to the passage of the destructive legislation. Of
course, just as a zoning ordinance is invalid as confiscatory
if it forbids all the uses to which the land is reasonably
adapted,17 a statute abolishing unused riparian rights might
be held invalid if the land, because shorn of them, could not
reasonably be used for any purpose. As most riparian lands,
however, would be reasonably capable of some use, even when
minus their normal riparian rights, it is entirely conceivable
that an uncompensated abolition of riparian rights could be
held valid as against the great majority of riparian owners. 7 '
Reasons for Protecting Unused Riparian Rights
It is submitted, nevertheless, that unused riparian rights
should not be abolished in New York without compensation.
The mere existence of a power does not establish the wisdom
of exercising it at every opportunity.'7 7 There would appear
to be a significant difference between the expectations and
plans of a purchaser of ordinary land and those of a purchaser
of riparian land. Whereas the buyer of ordinary land often
has no specific use in mind and is entirely willing to have
the future fate of his land determined by the course of unpredictable events, the buyer of riparian land normally invests
in it primarily because he intends at some time to exercise
the riparian rights incident to it."' Consequently an abolition
Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226, 15 N.E.2d
587, 117 A.L.R. 1110 (1938); Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d
353, 229 N.E.2d 591, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1967).
176. Analogical support for this suggestion seems to be afforded by Dennis v.
Village of Tonka Bay, 156 F.2d 672 (1946) upholding a zoning ordinance
restricting riparian land to residential use, although enforcement of the
ordinance prevented the riparian owner from exercising his riparian privilege of constructing a commercial boat dock. Accord, Poneleit v. Dudas,
141 Conn. 431, 106 A.2d 479 (1954). But an ordinance of this sort has
been held confiscatory where the burden on the riparian owner by the
restriction was heavy and the public benefit from the ordinance was small.
Johnson v. Apton, 18 N.Y.2d 668, 219 N.E.2d 868 (1966).
177. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 739; 20 A.L.R.2d
633 (1949); CRIBRET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAw, 46 (1958).
178. "The fronting of a lot on a navigable stream or bay often constitutes its
chief value and desirability whether for residence or business purpose. The
right of access to the property over the water, the unobstructed view of
the bay and the enjoyment of the privileges of the waters incident to
ownership of the bordering land would not in many cases be exchanged
for the price of an inland lot in the same vicinity. In many cases doubtless
the riparian rights incident to the ownership of the land were the principal
if not the sole inducement leading to its purchase by one and the reason
for the price charged by the seller."-Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry.,
75 Fla. 28, 79 So. 491 (1918). See also Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn.
686, 15 N.W.2d 174, 181 (1944).
175.
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of those rights, even if it does not render the land useless,
involves a loss to him which he will feel is confiscatory, even
though it may not be legally so classifiable.
A specially undesirable consequence of the superimposition on the New York riparian system of a version of the
appropriation system which abolished unused riparian rights
would be the reduction which would occur under such version
in the amount of riparian land which could be counted upon
to serve as a physical base from which to make recreational
use of streams and lakes. For example, suppose that when
the superimposing legislation was enacted, A owned land
riparian to a lake; that although the lake was suitable for
boating, fishing and swimming, A had never used the lake
for these purposes; that after the effective date of the act,
A sold his riparian tract to B, who began to boat on the lake
and to fish and swim in it; and that C thereafter applied for
an appropriative right to withdraw so much water from the
lake for purposes concededly beneficial that its utility for
recreational purposes would be destroyed if his application
were granted, would B's recreational uses be protected?
If the provision for the elimination of unused riparian
rights were held constitutional, as is entirely conceivable
though not entirely certain, 79 B's recreational enjoyment of
the lake would get no protection unless the superimposing
legislation contained a provision that an appropriation of
water for recreational purposes could be effected without a
diversion-a provision which apparently has not as yet been
embodied in the legislation of any appropriation doctrine
state; or unless the legislation provided for the withdrawal
from appropriation of waters specially adaptable to recreational use,... and B had persuaded the agency or official having jurisdiction to exercise this power with respect to the
lake to which his land was riparian; or unless B could
persuade such agency to deny C's application on the ground
that it would be against the public interest to grant it.181
Otherwise B's recreational use would have no protection. B
See text accompanying notes 171 to 175 supra.
See the statutes cited in Hudak, Modern Western Legislation as a Pattern
for Changes in the Law of Mont. Water Rights, 28 MONT. L. REv. 95,
99-100 (1966).
181. See Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATEn L. REV. 1,
48 (1967).
179.
180.
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did not acquire A's unused riparian recreational privileges
and rights because the new legislation would have destroyed
them before B bought A's riparian tract. B's exercise of
such privileges gave him no appropriative recreational right,
because diversion of water is essential to the acquisition of
any appropriative water right,'8 2 and because merely boating
upon, or fishing or swimming in a lake obviously does not
constitute a diversion of it.' 5
Granted that if one of the conditions above referred to
were fulfilled, B would have protection for his recreational
uses despite superimposition of a prior appropriation system
which did not preserve unused riparian rights, he could be
more certain of such protection, at least to a reasonable
degree,' 8 ' under New York's present riparian law, because A's
recreational privileges and rights, even though never used
by A, would have passed to him by the conveyance of A's
riparian tract. In Mississippi with its irretrievably silted
water, or in West Virginia with its scarcity of lakes and its
urgent need for industrial development, the creation of a
hazard to unused riparian recreational rights by resort to
the prior appropriation system might be a matter of relatively
small consequence; but in New York with its multitude of
beautiful streams and lakes eminently suitable for recreational uses, the creation of any hazard to such uses should
be avoided unless offset by advantages in other areas greater
than the prior appropriation system appears likely to offer.
In view of these considerations it is submitted that if New
York decides to superimpose a prior appropriation system
on its present riparian system, it should choose a version of
the prior appropriation system which protects unused
riparian rights.
182. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST
303 (1942); Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123
(1913); SAx, WATER LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 54 (1965) quoting
decision D 1030 of the Calif. Water Rights Board in 1961; Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mt. Power Co., 406 P.2d 798 (Colo.
1965).
183. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 43
(1967). Since use of a riparian right can be established without showing
a diversion, A's recreational use would have been protectible as part of his
riparian interest, if he had begun it prior to the enactment of the superimposing legislation, and so would have passed to B by a conveyance of A's
riparian tract.
184. That the rule that no riparian privileges are absolute and unconditional
but are exercisable only to a reasonable degree applies to recreational
privileges see George v. Village of Chester, 202 N.Y. 398, 95 N.E. 767
(1911).
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Also relevant to the general question as to whether New
York should superimpose a prior appropriation system on
its existing riparian system is the specific question as to
whether such superimposition would necessarily involve creation of water rights which would be more nearly perpetual
than a water right ought to be; i.e., rights destructible only
by abandonment, forfeiture, prescription or eminent domain.
Since rights of such durability are apparently characteristic
of all western prior appropriation systems, including the
newest,185 and since a system which did provide for rights
less durable could, therefore, scarcely be classified as a prior
appropriation system,' 86 an affirmative answer to this question would seem proper; and such an answer would furnish
a cogent reason why New York should not take the prior
appropriation road. The importance of retaining the riparian
doctrine principle of variability to a limited degree in order
to facilitate shifts in the pattern of water use in response to
changes in the relative importance of the several waterconnected activities has already been pointed out.187 To
abandon that principle altogether in order to encourage
development of water resources by private capital would be
going unnecessarily far, since, as already indicated, it would
seem possible to achieve a proper balance between the need
for certainty and the need for flexibility within the framework of the riparian system."8 '
Even under the Alaska Water Use Act, which may well be the most nearly
perfect prior appropriation legislation now in force (supra note 151),
appropriative water rights, once acquired, exist in perpetuity, unless abandoned, forfeited for cause or taken by eminent domain. Trelease, Alaska's
New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1967). While
appropriative rights can be destroyed by prescription in some western
states [Hutchins, Irrigation Water Rights in California, CIRMCULAR 452
REVISED, CALIF. AGRIcuL. EXPERIMENT STATION 35 (1967)], the Alaska Act
expressly provides that they cannot be acquired by prescription (ALAsKA
STAT. § 46.15.140 (1962)) ; and it would seem to follow that they could not
be destroyed by prescription.
186. If the correct interpretation of the Mississippi statute is that water rights
created under it can be terminated for good cause shown, and that a desire
to make water available to a prospective user whose activity would be of
more public importance than that of a holder of a previously issued permit
would constitute good cause [supra note 117], it is doubtful that the customary classification of the Mississippi legislation as a prior appropriation
act is justified.
187. See text accompanying notes 121 to 126 supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 129 to 132 aupra.
185.
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EFFECT ON GOVERNMENTAL WATER PROJECTS

As increasing demands for water in New York and all
too frequent droughts have made time of the essence with
respect to the completion of public projects designed to
protect and augment the supply of water available to the
people of the state, any action which would tend to delay
the completion of such projects would clearly be contrary to
the public interest. As pointed out above, lack of knowledge
as to the extent of the private water rights which would be
affected by such projects imposes a severe handicap on those
who must plan, execute and operate them."8 9 It follows that
if an attempt to superimpose some version of the prior appropriation system on existing New York riparian law would
substantially retard the clarification of the New York law
as to private water rights, that fact would constitute another
serious objection to such an attempt. It seems all too likely
that this would prove to be the case.
If a bill were introduced to superimpose some version of
the prior appropriation system on New York's riparian
system, it is unlikely that a decision as to whether to enact
it or defeat it would be soon arrived at. The speed with which
New York's recent anti-pollution legislation was enacted was
in large part referable to a great surge of public desire for
clean streams and lakes which had been seduously built up
during a long period of time. It seems unlikely that a proposal to adopt some version of the prior appropriation system
would be swept on to quick adoption by a similar swollen
tide of public opinion. While proposals have indeed been
made by a few New York citizens and at least one organization
that New York permit the appropriation of so-called surplus
waters, which would probably involve a partial substitution
of appropriation law for riparian law,"' there has been no
demand for such a step which could properly be characterized
as public. Substantially the same statement can be made
with respect to the more general request of agriculture and
industry for water rights more certain as to extent and duration. While this request has been renewed from time to time,
it has never been widely publicized, and seems not to have
been accompanied by the suggestion that authorization of
189. See text accompanying notes 7 to 14 and 108 to 110 supra.
190. Ses text arcompanying notes 161 to 15 supra.
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the acquisition of appropriative water rights would be the
best way to achieve the desired certainty.
The people of New York have lived for almost 200 years
under the riparian system; and apparently not many of
them have ever given thought to the possibility that their
failure to achieve greater prosperity than they now enjoy
may be attributable to their acquiescence in that system, or
that adherence to it has seriously retarded the development
of the state's water resources or has involved injustices which
cry for remedy. A proposal to superimpose some version of
the prior appropriation system on New York's riparian
system would in all probability be met with strong opposition 1 which would be encouraged by the deceleration of the
trend toward the prior appropriation system which began in
the eastern states ten years ago,1" 2 by the go-slow attitude
toward that system recommended by qualified commentators, ' and by the continued presence on the statute books of
191. It is worthy of note in this connection that when the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Natural Resources was sponsoring the bill which when
enacted added part V on Water Resources Planning & Development to N.Y.
CoNsERv. LAW Art. 5 (1966), it deemed it advisable to state that it would
create no new water rights, that all present rights and privileges to the
use and control of waters would be preserved, and that the rights of all
water users would be guaranteed; apparently to avoid opposition from
those who desired continued adherence to the riparian system, at least in
general. N.Y. Leg. Doc. (1959) No. 22, 158-165. "A case has not been made
for significant change in our riparian rights system, and I would hate to
think that a system which has its roots and took shape over a period of
600 years would be changed without the most careful consideration." Statement by Joseph R. Shaw on behalf of the Associated Industries of New
York, Hearings, Before New York Temporary State Comm'n on Water
Resources Planning, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15, at 152 (1964). "Our department
certainly is not ready for major changes in the water resources laws, or
even in the water rights and riparian laws." Statement by Horace S. Evans
on behalf of the New York Dept. of Public Works, Id. at 154. "Early in the
presentation, the riparian principles was defined as an attitude of luxury
and enforced waste. From our standpoint the riparian principle might
better be defined as an attitude of responsibility and enforced conservation ... Even a casual glance at a map of the Empire State indicates how
much of our development, both economic and social, has been affected by
water... This development has been achieved through and is dependent on
the firm basis of riparian rights. Our present and future economic growth
will require the maintenance of such rights." Statement by Ronald B. Peterson on behalf of the New York Dept. of Commerce, Id. at 155.
192. As to the original direction of the trend, see Maloney, Florida's New Water
Resources Law, 10 U. FLA. L. Rsv. 119, 126 (1957) ; HAsER & BERGEN, WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN U.S. (ch. by Haar & Gordon) 36 (1958); Hines,
A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Permit System, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 499, 518 (1967). But a recent count shows only two eastern
states as having substantially adopted the western law of prior appropriation. Trelease, Legal Contributions to Water Resources Development, U.
CONN. INST. OP WATER RESOURCES, REPORT No. 2, at 10 (1967).
193. CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER RIGHTS LAw 44 (1958); HABER & BERGEN, WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (ch. by Haar & Gordon) 47
1958); Maloney, Eastern Laws Concerning Minimum Stream Flows, paper
dlivered at SOUTh ASTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE 301 (1961); Agnor,
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other eastern states of provisions for the protection of
riparian rights which are not in express terms, at least,
limited to rights already exercised." 4 Though such opposition might in some cases be founded on misconceptions, it
would nevertheless be difficult to deal with. Persons and
corporations now exercising riparian privileges and enforcing riparian rights to their advantage and profit would be
apt to fear that at least part of what they now enjoy would
be taken from them by the introduction of a dual system of
water law. To persuade them that this was not so; that the
situation of others could be improved by such a measure
without prejudicing their own, would require a persistent
educational campaign of long duration, even if the truth lay
on the side of the proponents of change which, for reasons
pointed out hereinbefore, is somewhat less than certain.
Since the introduction of legislation superimposing some
version of the prior appropriation system on the New York
riparian system would immediately render the status of New
York riparian rights even less certain that it now is until
such legislation was either enacted or defeated; since that
status would remain as uncertain as it now is, if such legislation were defeated, except in the unlikely case that legislation of the sort recommended herein were considered contemporaneously and passed; and since the outcome of the
educational campaign without which legislation superimposing appropriative rights could have no hope of passage might
take many years to resolve, it is submitted that the introduction of such legislation would delay for too long a period
the clarification of New York private water rights which
should be effected to facilitate the planning and execution
of public water projects, and would, therefore, be contrary
to the public interest.
paper delivered at SOUTHEASTERN WATER LAW CONFERENCE 65

(1961);

OHIO WATER COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS ON WATER POLICY AND LEGIsLATION 13 (1965); Kendall, Basic Concepts of Private Water Rights, PROCEEDINGS NEW ENGLAND WATER RIGHTS LAW CONFERENCE 15 (1966).

194. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 6461 (1953) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.533, 11.437,
11.451, 11.455, 11.459, 11.463, 11.464(2) and 11.466 (1961); Ch. 781, § 9,
[1959] N.C. Sess. Laws; CODE OF LAWS OF S. CAR. § 70.47 (1962). And the
Minn. Water Resources Board recommended at 50 of its 1963 report on
water law that protection of vested common law private water rights be
provided by amendment of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.45 prescribing criteria
for the granting of permits. See also as to the relation of the N. Car. Water
Use Act of 1967 to riparian rights, Aycock, North Carolina's Water Use
Law, 46 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1967), especially at 3-4.
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Moreover, even if legislation superimposing some version
of a prior appropriation system on the existing New York
riparian system were to be enacted shortly after introduction,
it seems unlikely that the outlines of private water rights
in New York would have been made particularly clear by
such action. Judging from the western experience under
systems of water law which recognize both appropriative and
riparian rights, it is likely that the superimposition of any
version of the prior appropriation system on New York
riparian law would give rise to numerous uncertainties, and
that these would constitute new impediments to public projects until discovered, analyzed and eliminated. The coordination of appropriative and riparian water rights in such a way
as to accord fair protection to both has often proved to be a
difficult task.'
Because of the tolerance by the federal government of the enterprising activities on the public lands of
trespassing miners who evolved a prior appropriation system
of their own without benefit of legislation or judicial decision,
some of the western states were forced to develop a dual
system of water rights to avoid the perpetration of grave
injustice. 9 ' New York, however, is not so coerced by a fait
accompli. If a dual system of water rights appears to be
disadvantageous in the light of present conditions, New York
is free to reject it. It is submitted that for the reasons already
given a dual system would be disadvantageous, and should
be rejected.
CONCLUSION

It must be admitted, of course, that even the conservative
proposals for the clarification and revision of New York
riparian law which have been made herein might not be
promptly implemented by legislation and that the discouraging uncertainties as to the law on many important points
195. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the U8e
of Water, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 24 (1954). That the superimposition of a prior
appropriation system on Mississippi's riparian system has left and created
a number of uncertainties as to private water rights in that state, see
Champion, Prior Appropriation in Mississippi: A Statutory Analysis, 89
Miss. L.J. 1 (1967). It is conceivable, of course, that the legislation superimposing an appropriation system could be so skillfully drafted in the first
instance as to leave or create no uncertainties; but the experience in
Mississippi and elsewhere suggests that such perfection is not likely to be
achieved at so early a stage.
196. TRELEASE, BLOOMENTHAL & GERAUD, CASES AND MATERtALS ON NATURAL
REsouRcEs 2-3 (1965).
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and the overly strict limitations on non-riparian use might
continue for a considerable time, even though the task of
clarification and revision were not complicated by an attempt
to superimpose prior appropriation principles. It seems
probable, nevertheless, that the legislation recommended herein could achieve passage more readily than any providing for
the creation of appropriative rights, for it would not only
include the following desirable features:
(1) Protection for the investor in riparian land by
preserving unused riparian rights as well as
those already in use;
(2) Encouragement of construction of dams and
reservoirs by preventing riparian owners below
them from sharing in the resulting increased
water supply except on equitable terms;
(3) Definitions of domestic use and of riparian
land;
(4) Clear legalization of harmful uses of any sort,
when reasonable under all the circumstances;
and express authorization of consideration of
the public interest when passing on reasonableness;
(5) Facilitation of alteration in the pattern of
water use in response to changing conditions by
making it clear that riparian rights are transferable, and by retaining the riparian principle
of variability;
(6) Achievement of a proper balance between the
conflicting desiderata of certainty and flexibility by permitting a court or administrative
agency to guarantee in an appropriate ease that
the use declared reasonable may be continued
for a specified time; and
(7) Relaxation to a reasonable degree of the restrictions on non-riparian uses;
but would provide them within the framework of the riparian
system to which state officials concerned with water matters,
the legislature, the courts, and the people at large are accustomed. In short, it is submitted that the important task of
eliminating uncertainties in New York water law in order
to encourage the development of the water resources of the
state by private enterprise, and the even more important
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/4
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task of preparing the way for governmental projects for the
protection and augmentation of New York's water resources
by clarifying the extent of private water rights in New York,
could be more effectively expedited if an attempt were made
to perform those tasks by legislation which would fit easily
and naturally into the existing riparian doctrine framework
than by legislation which provided for the superimposition
of some version of the prior appropriation system on New
York's present riparian law.
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